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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Product Contamination in a Multi-Stage Food Supply Chain. (May 2012) 
Vijaya B. Chebolu-Subramanian, B.S.; M.S., Osmania University;  
M.S., University of Maryland, College Park 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Gary M. Gaukler 
 
Food product contamination leading to a food borne illness is real and has 
potentially devastating impact on supply chain operations and cost. However, it is not 
well understood from the quantitative perspective. This research seeks to fill this gap by 
providing a generic model of a multi-stage food supply chain consisting of a 
supplier/grower, processing center and retailer(s) and  analyzing the impact of food 
product contamination in this model. The supplier corresponds to the farm/grower of the 
raw material such as fruits and vegetables, the processing center processes the raw 
material into a final food product and the retailer corresponds to the supermarkets and 
grocery stores selling the food product to a customer. A situation where a contamination 
occurs at the supplier or processing center potentially resulting in a food borne illness to 
the customer is considered. The contamination is discovered through periodic sampling 
tests conducted by the grower, processing center or through the outbreak of a food borne 
illness. The supply chain is modeled utilizing a G/G/1 queuing system at the processing 
center and an order- up to policy at the retailer(s).  
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This research develops and compares multi-stage supply chain models with 
varying number of retailers. The negative dependence of contamination on the origin and 
mode of detection of the contamination is quantified.  The differences in individual food 
product attributes which can impact the cost of contamination are analyzed. The impact 
of supply chain structure and properties and detection policies on the severity of 
potential contamination cases is studied. The most cost effective sampling strategies 
which companies can adopt in the event of product contamination are derived. The 
payoff from the implementation of a quality control process which can eradicate 
contamination is evaluated. A numerical study of the impact of a real-world 
contamination event on a tomato and lettuce supply chain is also conducted.  
Finally, a traceability system capable of tracking and tracing back products in the 
event of a food product recall is incorporated in the supply chain model. The value of 
traceability for different supply chain scenarios is assessed through the implementation 
of an ARENA based simulation model.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1. Introduction 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that every year 
about 76 million people contract a food borne illness, about 325,000 require 
hospitalization and about 5000 die in the United States. A testimony presented to the 
House of Representatives in 2007 by the United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) designates oversight of food safety as a high-risk area needing urgent 
attention as it impacts public health, citizen's rights, and economic growth and could 
result in significant injury or loss of life, reduced economic efficiency and effectiveness 
(Shames 2007).  
The United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Economic Research 
Service (ERS) estimates that the annual economic cost of the five major food borne 
illnesses is approximately $6.9 billion (ERS 2001), (Golan, Roberts et al. 2004). Food 
borne illnesses can have widespread impact, for example a meat recall can affect the 
entire meat industry including downstream industries such as fast food restaurants and 
upstream suppliers such as ranchers (Golan, Krissoff et.al. 2004).  
Over the past decade the size and number of food products recalled in the United 
States has increased significantly. There has also been an increase in recall cases 
____________ 
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classified as class I recalls i.e. for foods that pose the greatest risk of illness or death. For 
instance the size of meat and poultry recalls has increased from nearly 6 million pounds 
in 1988 to about 36 million pounds in 2003 (Dyckman and Lansburgh 2004). During 
1993-96, the number of meat and poultry class I recalls averaged about 24 per year and 
amounted to 1.5 million pounds annually. During 1997-2000, class I recalls averaged 41 
per year and reached 24 million pounds annually. The number of food recall cases has 
also increased over the past decade, with more than 500 cases reported in the year 2002. 
Additionally in the year 2003 most cases were categorized as class I recalls (Ollinger 
and Ballenger 2003). Food product recalls and the outbreaks associated with them 
highlight a number of deficiencies of the present food safety systems, and underscore the 
need for greater oversight, more effective industry practices, and stronger safeguards 
(Sundlof 2009). 
 
1.2. Food Product Contamination and Recall 
Several high-profile food product recall cases covering a wide variety of products 
and local as well as global food supply chains have occurred in the recent past. The 
consequences and the fallout these cases have had on businesses, economy and public 
health has been severe.  
Peanut product recalls, 2008:  In December 2008 the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) along with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and public health officials in 
various states started investigating the multi-state outbreak of human infections caused 
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by Salmonella Typhimurium, which had been found in peanut products produced by the 
Peanut Corporation of America (PCA). As of  February 2009 as a part of the ongoing 
investigation and recall process CDC reported that 600 persons from 44 states had been 
infected with the outbreak strain of Salmonella Typhimurium apart from 1 person in 
Canada, and that the infection had contributed; to 8 deaths (Sundlof  2009).  
An investigation of an unopened container of King Nut peanut butter produced 
by PCA showed that it contained the same strain of Salmonella Typhimurium that was 
associated with illnesses linked to the outbreak. A recall of peanut butter and peanut 
paste produced by PCA was initiated. This recall was subsequently expanded to include 
all peanuts and peanut products, including all peanuts, granulated peanuts, peanut meal, 
peanut butter and peanut paste (Sundlof 2009).  
The investigations revealed that PCA distributed potentially contaminated 
products to more than 300 consignee firms, many of whom further distributed these 
contaminated products for consumption as peanut butter or as ingredients in several 
different products, such as cookies, crackers, cereal, candy and ice cream. Many of the 
companies that received peanut and peanut products from PCA in turn recalled those 
products, thus increasing the scope of recall exponentially. The FDA released a list of 
nearly 1800 entries in 17 categories of products recalled by about 200 companies as part 
of a consumer information campaign (Sundlof 2009).  
Milk product recalls, 2008: One of the most serious recall cases in recent times 
occurred due to the contamination of milk products through melamine in China. At the 
beginning of September 2008 it was reported that some brands of infant milk formula 
4 
 
were contaminated with melamine. The contamination with melamine happened in the 
primary production stage where it was intentionally added to raw milk at milk collection 
centers for at least 9 months (World Health Organization Expert Review Meeting 2008). 
Almost 300,000 babies were taken ill due to consumption of the contaminated milk 
powder, the death toll rose to 6 infants and more than 860 were hospitalized with 154 
classified as severe cases by the end of the year 2008 (Branigan 2008). 
Chinese inspectors on conducting investigations found the chemical melamine in 
several batches of infant milk powder produced by 22 companies nationwide. The 
authorities ordered a halt to the sale of the contaminated products which included among 
others well-known Chinese brands such as Sanlu, Mengniu, Yili and Yashili. (Xuequan 
2008). Chinese officials seized and recalled more than 10,000 tons of baby formula. 
They seized 2,176 tons of milk powder in the warehouse of Sanlu Group, producer of the 
milk powder and recalled 8,218 tons that had been on the market (Yuxia 2008). 
Several other countries also reported finding melamine in milk containing 
products, dairy and non-dairy products manufactured in China such as liquid milk, 
frozen yogurt dessert, biscuits, candies and in coffee drinks (World Health Organization 
Expert Review Meeting 2008). The repercussions of the contamination event were felt 
far and wide across the globe. The European Union announced a ban on imports of baby 
food containing Chinese milk; Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and India 
joined the rapidly growing list of countries pulling out contaminated Chinese food 
products from store shelves (Saputra et.al. 2008). The United States also issued a ban on 
Chinese food imports; such a broad ban by the Food and Drug Administration on goods 
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from an entire country rather than from a particular manufacturer was unusual and 
reflected the level of concern over how widespread the problem was. Importers to the 
United States had to certify that food products were free of diary or melamine failing 
which the goods were stopped at the border (Macartney 2008). The melamine scandal 
had devastating impact on China’s dairy industry, leading to numerous questions about 
the safety of food products. It was reported that Chinese milk exports had dropped by 92 
percent since September 2008, when news of the contaminated milk had first emerged 
(Jacobs 2008). 
So far the legal outcomes of the milk product contamination and recall case have 
also been severe with two men sentenced to death and the chairwoman of a dairy 
conglomerate in China receiving a life sentence for their roles in the scandal. A liability 
lawsuit seeking more than $5.2 million in compensation was also filed in Beijing against 
a group of dairy companies by the families of 213 children who died or fell ill from 
consuming tainted milk (McDonald 2009). 
Jack in the Box recall, 1993: In 1993 there was an unusual increase in the 
number of children with bloody diarrhea in the state of Washington. This alerted state 
health officials to the possibility of a food borne illness outbreak. Health officials on 
investigation identified E. coli O157:H7-contaminated hamburgers from Jack in the Box 
restaurants as the cause of the outbreak. Totally, 73 Jack in the Box restaurants in the 
states of Washington, Idaho, California, and Nevada were found to be involved in the 
outbreak and recall. Seven hundred people became ill and four children died as a result 
of this food contamination. Epidemiologists at the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention concluded that the outbreak was due to contamination in meat processing and 
cooking (Bell et al. 1994). 
Jack in the Box reported losses of approximately $160 million from reduced 
sales and other costs (Roberts et al. 1997). These costs were due to the company's recall 
of all hamburger meat from their restaurants and legal costs.  
Spinach recall, 2006: The 2006 E.coli outbreak in California due to the 
contamination of spinach resulted in a detrimental impact on public health and the local 
economy. The FDA reported 205 illnesses and 3 deaths due to the outbreak. Industry 
representatives estimated losses to range from $37 million to $74 million (Shames 
2007).  
Meat, poultry recall, 1999: Samples from a meat and poultry processing plant 
in Arkansas of the Thorn Apple Valley Inc Company based in Michigan tested positive 
for Listeria in January 1999. The plant operations were shut down and a recall of 
products worth £30 million took place. As a result the Thorn Company faced $ 5.1 
million in losses of production and sales and reported $ 184 million as debt to creditors. 
Finally the company filed for bankruptcy and was bought by Iowa beef producers inc. 
(Skees et al. 2001). 
 
1.3. Traceability in the Food Supply Chain 
In the last decade there has been a growing interest in traceability systems as 
tools to enable the tracking of food products through the supply chain in the event of a 
food product recall. Golan, Krissoff et al. (2004) in their USDA Economic report define 
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traceability systems as recordkeeping systems designed to track the flow of product or 
product attributes through the production process or supply chain.  
Traceability systems can help companies isolate the source and extent of these 
food safety or quality-control problems and companies have an incentive to invest in 
traceability systems because they help minimize the production and distribution of 
unsafe or poor quality products, which in turn minimizes the potential for bad publicity, 
liability and recalls (Golan, Krissoff et al. 2004) (Smith et al. 2005). Traceability can 
also reduce anonymity and facilitate the allocation of liability in a supply chain (Patel 
and Desai 2011), (Buhr 2003). The U.S. private sector has voluntarily adopted a 
diversified and significant capacity to trace food without government regulation, 
motivated by the desire to improve product recalls (Golan, Krissoff et al., 2004). 
Companies are thus seeking to improve supply chain efficiency, create product 
differentiation and increase food safety and quality control, through the use of these 
traceability systems to keep track of product flow along the supply chain. The use of 
these systems has also been linked to lower cost distribution networks, lower recall costs 
and higher sales (Golan, Krissoff et al. 2004). Overall, companies can benefit monetarily 
by implementing these systems. Therefore these economic benefits are driving the study 
and development of traceability systems across the U.S. food supply chain (Golan, 
Krissoff et al. 2004). 
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1.4. Motivation  
There has been a considerable increase in the number, severity and spread of 
food product contamination and recalls in the past few decades. Factors such as 
consumption patterns, demographics and the structure of the modern food supply chain 
are some of the reasons impacting the increase in food product contamination and 
recalls. 
The change in national demographics and consumption patterns also underscore 
the need for a better understanding of food product contamination and recalls. The risk 
of severe or life-threatening symptoms from food borne illnesses is higher for older 
adults, young children, pregnant women and immune compromised individuals. A shift 
in U.S. demographics means that that more of the U.S. population is, and increasingly 
will be, susceptible to food borne illnesses.  
Additionally a change in consumption patterns is taking place with people 
increasingly eating raw foods or foods with minimal processing increasing the risk of 
food borne illnesses, as these kinds of foods are often associated with food 
contamination. For example, according to the USDA leafy greens such as the spinach is 
one the food groups most likely to be associated with a food borne illness. The average 
consumption of spinach has risen by 180 percent from 1992 to 2005 (Shames 2008). 
The globalization of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) due to economic forces 
has resulted in reorganization of production structures in the food supply chain to 
locations across the globe (Sideri 1997). MNCs are taking advantage of regions with 
different capital and labor markets. The pressures of cost reduction in the food supply 
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chain partly also due to the heavy competition in the retail grocery arena has given rise 
to what is now considered the mainstream food supply chain (Roth et al. 2008). This has 
resulted in labor-intensive production being relocated to cheaper labor economies to cut 
costs (Buckley 2009).  Thus, the imported proportion of U.S. food consumption has 
witnessed a rapid increase. The FDA estimates that 80 percent of seafood and 20 percent 
of produce is imported from abroad (Roth et al. 2008).  
The guarantee of lowest price is the order winner for products which are ordered 
through this selection process. Hence, suppliers tend to take short cuts in quality or 
product safety in an attempt to provide the lowest cost (Lyles et al. 2008). There is no 
specification or emphasis on product safety which makes products thus sourced more 
vulnerable to risk of contamination. However, recent reports of contamination in 
imported foods have raised serious concerns about quality risks of global sourcing. 
These incidents have raised questions about business and supply chain management 
practices which have resulted in contaminated foods reaching the end consumer (Roth et 
al. 2008). As more large-scale labor markets compete for international trade, the 
incentives to cut corners will increase and the overlooking of contaminated products 
may rapidly become a more common occurrence (Klarevas 2008). 
Thus, modern day global food supply chains tend to be associated with greater 
vulnerability and risks of product contamination due to lack of accountability, lower 
visibility and quality failures. They are also prone to lower responsiveness due to longer 
lead times (Roth et al., 2008). Additionally the sheer length of the supply chain and 
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slower movement of inventory and events makes it difficult for supply chain partners to 
monitor and control the actions of up and downstream partners (Lyles et al., 2008). 
For example if we consider the recent China-melamine-milk product recall 
scandal the World Health Organization attributed many of the problems to the rapid pace 
of development of food and agricultural production in the past few decades. However, 
they also say that the agencies in charge of food safety and quality control are not 
developing at the same pace (Schlein 2008). It should however be emphasized that these 
problems are universal to most global supply chains in today's world and are not just 
unique to Chinese supply chains (Lyles et al. 2008). 
Even though food product contamination is real and has potentially devastating 
effects on companies and supply chains, it is still not very well understood from a 
quantitative perspective. This work seeks to fill that gap by providing a generic model of 
a food supply chain, and by quantifying the cost of contamination in that model and 
analyzing factors which impact the magnitude of the contamination event.  
Companies build traceability systems to improve supply chain efficiency and 
build lower-cost distribution systems, but simply tracing a product in the supply chain 
does not improve supply management unless the traceability system is paired with an 
supply chain inventory control system (Golan, Krissoff et al. 2004) (Smith et al. 2005). 
In this work we consider the tracking and tracing of a product in the supply chain model 
built to evaluate the value of traceability in the event of a contamination. 
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1.5. Scope of Research 
This research work attempts to quantitatively model the food contamination 
event in its entirety from the supply chain perspective. The cost of product 
contamination is quantified for a generic food supply chain. In particular, the amount of 
product that is affected by a contamination event and the time it takes from when the 
contamination is introduced until the contamination event is detected are quantified.  
This is done by considering the different origins and modes of detection of 
contamination. Various product properties and supply chain attributes which can impact 
the magnitude of a food contamination event are also analyzed. Further, the impact of 
incorporating product traceability in the event of a food contamination is also studied. In 
particular, this research work seeks to answer the following major questions: 
1. How does the negative impact of a contamination event depend on the 
origin and the mode of discovery of the contamination? This is an important 
consideration; because quantifiable answers to this question may help companies better 
understand the risk profile of different stages of the food supply chain, and to be able to 
compare the relative merit of preventive quality control. 
2. How do differences in individual product properties, supply chain 
structure and attributes impact the severity of contamination? Generalizable answers to 
this question may help companies understand the risks that certain product groups or 
supply chain configurations (e.g., long lead time global sourcing) pose. 
3. What is the value of tracking and tracing products in the event of a food 
product contamination and recall?  Quantifying the value of traceability in a given 
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supply chain scenario may help companies in evaluating the economic benefits of 
implementing traceability systems.  
Due to the high risk of economic losses associated with a food product recall, 
companies when faced with a food product contamination scenario may have a tendency 
to delay a product recall. However, delaying a recall may also lead to higher costs when 
there is large scale food contamination leading to a food borne illness. Therefore a recall 
decision has to be made at the “optimal time” to minimize losses from the perspective of 
the companies. This decision will depend on the magnitude of the food contamination 
event and factors such as whether the event is local or global (Skees et al. 2001).  
This research work by quantifying the scope of the contamination event can help 
companies make more informed decisions in the case of a contamination event. This will 
give an overall view and aid in getting a better picture of the impact of a food. 
 
1.6. Literature Review 
The literature in the areas of food contamination and recall deal with issues 
ranging from the medical costs, market impact, shareholder wealth and consumer 
reactions to implementation of safety systems and traceability of a food supply chain. 
To aid policy making the USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS) uses 
previous case history data to estimate the costs for a number of food borne illnesses 
(ERS Food Borne Illness Calculator, 2009). For example, the ERS estimates that the 
annual economic cost of Salmonellosis is $2,544,394,334 (Golan 2003). These estimates 
are only for related medical costs which is just one of the indirect costs of a food safety 
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event and are based on data collected (Golan 2003). In our research we quantitatively 
approximate the overall costs of the event which include several other direct and indirect 
costs and not just the medical costs.  
There have been several papers in literature which study consumer reactions, 
changes in consumer demand, consumer perceptions and sales losses due to a food 
contamination event. Jonge et al. (2007) apply structural equation modeling to 
understand the determinants influencing consumer perceptions of food safety incidents. 
The results indicate that some of these determinants are consumer trust in operators in 
the food supply chain, safety perceptions about product groups and personal recall 
experiences (Jonge 2007).  
Marsh et al. (2004) empirically test the impact of meat product recalls on 
consumer demand in the USA by estimating an absolute price version of the Rotterdam 
demand model. Their findings indicate that FSIS's meat recall events have a significant 
impact on demand. They also find that any positive effects on substitutes for a recalled 
product were offset by a more general negative effect on meat demand as a whole. There 
was also a shift from meat to consumption of other products. In this research the authors 
are concerned about shift in consumption patterns, change in consumer demands and 
impact of information flow on consumer decisions in the face of a food a contamination 
event.  
Piggott and Marsh (2004) theoretically model consumer response to food safety 
information. Their paper develops an economic and empirical model to study whether 
food safety information about beef, pork and poultry has impacted meat consumption in 
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the U.S. over the last several decades. They find pre-committed levels of meat 
consumption which are impacted by time trends, seasonal factors and food safety 
information. Food safety information is found to be detrimental to demand and there are 
spillover or substitution effects from one meat to another (Piggott and Marsh 2004). 
Pennings et al. (2002) study consumer reactions to a food contamination crisis. 
They show that by decoupling consumer risk response behavior into separate 
components of risk perception and risk attitude, a more robust prediction of consumer 
reactions is possible. Using an expected utility model and average sum score on risk-
attitude scale they study the reactions of German, Dutch and American consumers to 
BSE (mad cow disease). They conclude that marketers’ response to a food 
contamination event should be based on whether the consumer behavior is driven by risk 
perceptions or risk attitudes (Pennings et al. 2002).  
Thomsen et al. (2006) use an empirical model to measure sales losses for 
frankfurter brands which experienced a recall and the impact of the recall on other 
brands in the same category. They conclude from their model that recalls have adverse 
impact on sales of brands and the decline in sales is significant enough to warrant an 
incentive to minimize potential contamination events. They also state that brand equity 
provides a sign to the customers about food safety and can insulate firms from industry 
wide recall problems (Thomsen et al. 2006).  
In the papers cited above the authors analyze consumer perceptions, behavior and 
lost sales in an attempt to arrive at a better understanding of a food contamination event 
by. In contrast, this research quantifies the impact of a food contamination event from a 
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supply chain perspective. The fallout of the event on the entire costs and product 
inventory is quantitatively approximated. The lost sales due to a food product recall is 
accounted for as a component of the direct costs of the food contamination event but the 
others costs involved are also considered. 
There are other papers which analyze the fallout of a food contamination event 
on shareholders, stock markets and company valuations. Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) 
examine the reductions in valuations of food companies due to food contamination 
incidents. Their research seeks to quantify the impact of a recall on shareholder wealth 
(Thomsen and McKenzie 2001). 
Salin (2000) uses real option valuation techniques to analyze how an agribusiness 
investor's decision will be influenced by the risk of a food safety incident. The author 
states that concerns about food safety affect investors’ perceptions as returns for a firm 
can be expected to fall drastically in the event of a product recall (Salin 2000). Hooker 
and Salin (1999) use stock market reactions to four recent recalls which vary by product 
type, scope and severity to study the impact of food recalls. A partial event analysis 
technique is used to demonstrate the impact of these recalls. The results provide insight 
about the value that financial markets place on food safety. The authors for these papers 
as in other cases do not study the various other direct or indirect costs of a recall. They 
mainly focus on the impact of recalls on company valuations and shareholder losses, 
which can be considered to be one of the indirect costs of a recall. 
To summarize the related work cited above, most papers deal with certain 
indirect costs or fallouts of a food contamination event mainly from a consumer 
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perspective. In this research work however the product contamination and recall event is 
quantitatively modeled in its entirety from the supply chain perspective. The different 
origins and modes of detection of contamination, the product inventory affected and the 
direct as well as indirect costs of a food recall event are taken into account. Also various 
product and supply chain attributes which can impact the magnitude of a food 
contamination event are analyzed.  
Akkerman et al. (2010) review quantitative operations management approaches 
to food distribution management, and relate this to challenges faced by the industry. One 
of the focus areas of this paper is food safety and they review literature in this area 
survey the research contribution and identify challenges for future research (Akkerman 
et al. 2010). 
Tromp et al. (2010) model the transmission of salmonella through the broiler 
production chain. They utilize data collected from a Dutch broiler supply chain. They 
intend the model to be a tool for policymakers and industry to determine appropriate 
intervention strategies (Tromp et al. 2010).  
Van Asselt et al. (2010) describe a method to filter the most important critical 
factors related to food safety risks in production chains. Their methodology comprises a 
comparison between a traditional and a new product from the same food chain using 
expert judgment, group discussion and individual ranking (Van Asselt et al. 2010).  
In this dissertation work a generic food supply chain is modeled using inventory 
control and queuing principles to determine the impact of product and supply chain 
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properties on the scale of a contamination event. This model is subsequently applied to a 
recent real-time product contamination event. 
Various systems and standards have also been developed over the past decades to 
identify, manage and reduce food safety risks. The best-known are the hazard analysis 
critical control point (HACCP) system, the ISO 22000 standard (ISO 2005) and the 
British BRC standards (British Retail Consortium 2004) (Akkerman et al. 2010). There 
are papers which discuss the use of specific software based procedures for the 
implementation of the HACCP system (Tuominen et al. 2003), (Van Gerwen et al. 
1997).  For example, Bertolini et al. (2007) utilize a fault tree analysis for 
implementation of the HACCP system.  
Charlier and Valceschini (2008) study the economic incentives that the private 
sector has in the implementation of traceability in food chains in which specific sanitary 
risks exist (Charlier and Valceschini 2008). Based on case study illustrations of 
European meat and poultry firms, Buhr (2003) use case studies of European mean and 
poultry firms to analyze the role of traceability in a firm’s ability to limit the depth and 
size of product recall (Buhr 2003). Desai and Patel (2011) utilize case study data to 
model the key factors influencing traceability for the E.coli contamination of beef (Desai 
and Patel 2011). 
Pouliot and Sumner show that exogenous increases in food traceability can create 
incentives for farms and marketing firms to supply safer food by increasing liability 
costs (Pouliot and Sumner 2008).  
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There are papers available in literature which discuss the use of RFIDs ( Radio 
Frequency Identification), sensor networks and software agents utilized in the 
implementation of traceability systems for specific case studies (Abad et al. 2007), (Ngai 
et al. 2008) (Hannus et al. 2003), (Mousavi et al. 2005), (Thompson et al. 2005) and 
(Jedermann et al. 2006). The exact traceability system implemented in a particular food 
supply chain will depend on several factors including the product type and the electronic 
agreements in place between enterprises (Fritz and Schiefer 2009). 
In this work, the tracking and tracing information from a traceability system is 
integrated with the supply chain model built to assess the value of traceability for 
different scenarios.  
 
1.7. Summary 
This chapter includes the introduction to the research, descriptions of recent food 
product contamination and recall cases, traceability systems, motivation and scope of the 
research. It also presents a summary of literature in the area of food product 
contamination, recalls and traceability systems in order to highlight the contribution this 
research. 
It is stated that this research seeks to quantify the negative impact of a food 
contamination event from the supply chain perspective. A generic multi-stage supply 
chain model consisting of a grower, processing center and retailers is considered.  This 
research intends to quantify the negative dependence of a contamination event on the 
origin and mode of detection on the contamination. It also aims to analyze the impact of 
product properties, supply chain structure and properties on the event. Further a 
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numerical study based on the model is conducted. A traceability system is incorporated 
into the model to study the value of tracking and tracing products in a supply chain. 
The next chapter presents a detailed description of the supply chain model and 
origin and mode of detection of the contamination event.  The various factors which 
impact the behavior of the model are then analyzed mathematically. 
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CHAPTER II 
FOOD CONTAMINATION IN A MULTI-STAGE SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
2.1.  Model Overview 
In a general food supply chain, growers of fruits and vegetables can market their 
produce through shippers, sell it directly to customers at farmer's markets and roadside 
stands, or sell it to processors. Direct sales to customers are small, accounting for only 2 
percent of final fresh produce consumption in 1997 (Golan, Krissoff et.al. 2004). On the 
other hand, processing is an important part of the produce industry. In 2002, 86 percent 
of vegetables and fruits produced in the United States by weight went into processing 
(Golan, Krissoff et.al. 2004). A supply chain somewhat similar to this is depicted for 
processed food products by Kumar and Budin (2006). Figure 1 shows the basic multi-
stage supply chain configuration. 
1. Fresh fruits and vegetable, e.g., tomatoes, lettuce: The supplier 
corresponds to the farm or grower, the processing center processes the produce into a 
product such as bagged salad, canned spinach, or repackaged fruit for resale. The retailer 
is the supermarket which sells these processed or repackaged products to customers. 
2. Canned produce, e.g., peanut butter: In this case the supplier is the grower 
of produce, the processing center is the plant processing and conserving the produce as 
well as performing the canning operation. The retailer is the grocery store or 
supermarket selling peanut butter. 
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Figure 1: Multi-stage food supply chain with multiple retailers 
3. Meats: Most of the meat such as beef that Americans consume originates 
from cattle born and raised on one of the country's 800,000 cow-calf farms (Golan, 
Krissoff et.al. 2004). Cattle ready for slaughter are transported to slaughter or processing 
plants where beef carcasses are cut and packaged into “boxed beef” or “case-ready” 
retail cuts and delivered to grocery stores (Golan, Krissoff et.al. 2004). In this case, the 
supplier corresponds to the cow-calf farms; the processing center is the slaughter plant, 
and the retailer a grocery store or supermarket which sells the final product to the 
consumer.  
In our model we consider a situation where a contamination has already occurred 
in the food supply chain which leads to a food borne illness. The detection of 
contaminated products and the subsequent initiation of a product recall can occur 
through one of the following modes (Teratanavat, Salin and Hooker 2005), (Dyckman 
and Lansburgh 2004): 
Supplier Retailer
Processing 
center
Retailer
Retailer
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1. Through periodic product sampling or testing conducted by companies or 
government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS) or the firms itself. 
2.  Through the outbreak of food borne illness incidents as discovered by 
government agencies or reported by customers. 
Teratanavat, Salin and Hooker (2005) state that the probability of discovering the 
recall problem through testing by the FSIS is 44.6%, the probability that it is discovered 
by the firms is 23.7%, the probability that the food borne illness incidents are discovered 
by government agencies is 17% and the probability that they are discovered by 
customers is 14.7% respectively. 
 
2.2. Customer 
The customer purchases the final product from one of the retailers, consumes it 
and, in the event of a product contamination having occurred, may contract a food borne 
illness. The time at which a customer purchases a product will be determined by the 
customer demand at that retailer and the service level offered by the retailer. 
 It is assumed that the customer consumes the product prior to the end of its shelf 
life and the time of consumption is uniformly distributed between the time of purchase 
and the end of shelf life of the product. The distribution of the time of consumption of a 
product will depend on the product type as fresh products such as tomatoes will be 
consumed sooner as compared to canned produce or frozen meats which can last for a 
longer time.  
23 
 
The shelf life of a product is denoted by H and is counted from the time the 
finished product enters the finished goods inventory (FGI) at the processing center. This 
is because the shelf life of a food product is commonly defined as the time period 
between the manufacture and the retail purchase of the product during which the product 
is of satisfactory quality (Kilcast and Subramaniam 2000). 
The food borne illness will manifest itself after a specific incubation period. The 
incubation period is the interval between ingestion of a food contaminated with enough 
pathogens to cause illness and the appearance of the initial symptom of the illness 
(Investigation Operations Manual 2008 FDA). Further, it is assumed that there is an 
exogenous probability p  that a customer who consumes the contaminated food product 
shows the illness symptoms. The probability of a customer consuming a product 
showing the symptoms in actuality will depend on the product type, customer 
demographics etc.  
It is assumed that there is no time lag between a customer showing the illness 
symptoms and reports of the illness. Though realistically there will be a time lag 
between a customer experiencing and reporting an illness it is ignored as it is difficult to 
quantify mathematically. It is also supposed that every illness due to contamination is 
reported. In reality this may not be so as some illnesses may go unreported. 
 
2.3. Retailers 
Consider a supply chain with a total number of r retailers. It is assumed that the 
customer demand per time period at each of the retailers is independent of each other, 
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stationary over time and can be expressed as a normal random variable D , with known 
mean μ and standard deviation σ	D
 with i = 1, ⋯ , r. The total demand over the 
multiple retailers is D = ∑ D .  
For mathematical tractability of the model, it is assumed that there is full 
backordering at the retailers. An order-up to policy is in place at each retailer; that is, the 
retailer sets a target inventory level, and every review period (e.g., every day) the retailer 
orders such that his inventory level is brought up to that target level. It is also assumed 
that the probability of encountering no demand at all during the review period is zero, 
and hence the retailer places an order every review period. The coefficient of variation of 
demand is assumed to be such that the probability of non-positive demand is negligible. 
The lead time for receiving a shipment from the processing center to each retailer 
is assumed to be l time periods for i = 1, ⋯ , r. The lead time demand Dalso follows a 
normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σD. Let the target service 
level for the retailer be β, then the retailer's order-up to levelR, is given by FR =β , where F represents the normal cumulative density function (cdf) of the lead time 
demand D. In this control system, an order will be shipped from the processing center 
to each retailer every period. Hence if the lead time is l periods from the processing 
center to the retailer, then there will always be l  orders outstanding in any period after 
an order is placed. 
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2.4. Processing Center 
The processing center needs to satisfy the combined demand from all 
retailers D = ∑ D , with standard deviation σ	D
 = ∑ σ	D
 . Since it is assumed 
that there is backordering at the retailers, the processing center will see a demand stream 
that is equivalent to the aggregation of the retailer demand streams, and every period an 
order will be shipped from the processing center to each retailer. 
The processing center is assumed to have finite capacity. This finite capacity is 
modeled by formulating a G/G/1 queuing system (Allen 1978), (Buzacott and 
Shantikumar 1993).  Following our macro view of the basic supply chain, this single 
server does not represent a particular machine, but rather the abstraction of all the 
processing steps that happen at the processing center. A pictorial representation of the 
process is given in Figure 2. 
Raw material arrives from the supplier to the processing center in batches of 
fixed size k . The inter-arrival time of batches to the processing center is denoted by the 
random variable A! . Batches wait in the queue until service on individual items in the 
batch commences. In processing, the batches are broken apart and the individual items 
(e.g., single fruit or cartons of fruit) are served by a single server. The service time of an 
individual item in the batch is denoted by the random variable S .  Both  A!  and S  are 
assumed to be known characteristics of the queue; that is, it is assumed that their 
distributions as well as the distributional parameters are known.  
It is also assumed that each item in the batches of raw material arriving from the 
supplier is processed into m number of final products, reaching the finished goods 
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inventory (FGI). For example, cartons of fruits may be processed to produce m cans of 
fruit. The processing center has the service level β$. 
 
Figure 2: Macro queuing model of the processing center 
Such a batch processing system is similar to that examined in Curry and 
Deuermeyer (2002). Using the known customer demand distribution D at the retailer and 
the supplier's fixed batch size k, the batch inter arrival time  A! (which corresponds to 
the time between shipments from the supplier) is optimally set so as to replenish the 
processing center's FGI at a rate equal to the customer demand rate, as the inflows must 
Supplier Retailer
FGI
Batch arrival
Individual 
processing
Processing center
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equal the outflows in steady state . The inter departure time between individual items is I  
and the replenishment of the FGI takes place at a rate R. In steady state condition by the 
conservation principle the same number of units must depart the processing center as 
those that enter the processing center. 
  E	D
 = E	R
 = '	(
 = )*'	+,
                                                                                                   (2.1)   
 Therefore the expected batch inter arrival time can be set to be                                 
E	A!
 = )*'	1
 = )*'	2
 = kmE	I
                                                                                                (2.2) 
In order to properly describe the FGI inventory system at the processing center, 
the optimal safety stock ss45467  that the processing center will carry needs to be 
computed.  The appropriate stocking level of finished goods inventory at the processing 
center, taking into account risk pooling due to demand variability and the variability of 
FGI replenishment through the queuing process. 
Lemma 2.4.1: The safety stock at the processing center is 889:9;<=>?@ , A =
B CD∑ E	=>?F
GHF  + E	A
JGK, where B the standardized value corresponds to the 
service level at the processing center LM .  
Proof: The need for safety stock at the processing center is determined by two factors: 
(1) the variability in the customer demand at the retailers and (2) the variability in the 
replenishment of the FGI at the processing center. The safety stock for (1) is dependent 
on the variability of the orders over the lead time placed by each retailer i, and the safety 
stock for (2) is given by the variability of the replenishment rate R  over the queue 
service time at the processing center. The safety stock for portion (1) is: 
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∑ σ	D
  and safety stock of portion (2) is σ	R
. Due to risk pooling the safety stock 
at the processing center is:     
 ss45467D , R =
z CD∑ σ	D
G  + σ	R
OGK                                                                                               (2.3) 
The variance of the FGI replenishment rate R has to be calculated in terms of the 
model parameters to estimate the safety stock in Lemma 2.4.1. To this end, the standard 
analysis method for G/G/1 queues with FCFS service is used to develop relationships 
between successive jobs through the system at the processing center. Then under suitable 
conditions when stationary state exists, taking the limit as the number of jobs goes to 
infinity yields relationships that are valid in steady state (Curry and Deuermeyer 2002).  
Lemma 2.4.2: The variance of the FGI replenishment rate A is, 
  STU	A
 = V W XY	Z
[\]
G ^'	+,
\_`abc,dc,\ Cef gd	h
dc,i\Kjfegd	h
dc,i\kjG('	+,
e)'	l
)'	l
)* + E	SG
 −
W n	o
[GK. 
 Proof: A standard approach in queuing literature called the Allen-Cullen approximation 
is used to develop the following relations (Allen 1978). The notation and development 
parallels Buzacott and Shanthikumar (1993) and the renewal approximation is used to 
estimate the second moment of  I  (Curry and Deuermeyer 2002). 
 E	IG
 = 'p\jG'	p
'	l
)* + E	SG
                                                                                             (2.4)           E	MG
 = E	A!
GscG	A!
(1 − uG) + (1 − u)Gv                                                                  (2.5) 
29 
 
  E	M
 = E	A!
 − kE	S
                                                                                                           (2.6) M  is the idle time of the machine/server and cG	A!
 is the squared coefficient of 
variation of the batch arrival time, 
cG	A!
 = Var	A!
E	A!
G                                                                                                                      (2.7) 
The server steady state utilization factor u  is given by,  
u = E	S!
E	A!
                                                                                                                                   (2.8) 
where the batch service time S! is the sum of k individual item service times, E	S!
 = kE	S
                                                                                                                            (2.9) 
The variance of the item inter departure time can be calculated using the standard 
relationship for variance,  
Var	I
 = E	IG
 − E	I
G                                                                                                           (2.10) 
By substitution from equations (2.1) and (2.5) to (2.11): 
Var	I

=

E	A!
G _Var	A!
E	A!
G C1 − fkE	S
E	A!
iGK + f1 − kE	S
E	A!
iGk + 2(E	A!
 − kE	S
)E	S
km
+ E	SG

− f 1E	D
iG                                                                                                                                  (2.11) 
30 
 
The variance of the FGI replenishment rate σG	R
 using the Delta method (Taylor's 
series approximation) is:  
Var	R

= f 1E	I
GiG    Var	I
                                                                                                                  (2.12) 
From equations (2.1) and (2.12), Var	R
 in terms of the model parameters is: 
Var	R

= 
1f 1E	D
iG
G

E	A!
G _Var	A!
E	A!
G C1 − fkE	S
E	A!
iGK + f1 − kE	S
E	A!
iGkkm
+ 2(E	A!
 − kE	S
)E	S
km + E	SG
 + E	SG

− f 1E	D
iG                                                                                                                               (2.13) 
 
2.5. Supplier 
It is assumed that there is ample raw material and there is instantaneous 
production in place at the supplier. Separate inventory holding or storage facilities are 
not modeled at the supplier. Inventory holding at the supplier is neglected because there 
are usually few, if any, production steps at the supplier. Hence, the system at the supplier 
is modeled as a push system that sends raw material directly to the processing center in 
batches. The processing center acts as a pull system which receives batches of raw 
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material from the supplier based on the expected demand rate. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the produce batches are assembled instantaneously at the supplier.  
In line with the needs of the processing center, the supplier ships a batch of size k  
to the processing center every )*'	1
  periods, where D = ∑ D . The lead time from the 
supplier to the processing center is denoted by L. 
 
2.6. Model Evaluation 
This model considers the stage at which the contamination is introduced into the 
supply chain and the mode of detection of the contamination. The relative impact of 
contamination origination at the supplier/grower, versus contamination occurring at a 
processing center is contrasted. As described above the detection of contamination can 
take place through sampling of the product or through food borne illness reports. The 
sampling can be conducted at the supplier, processing center or retailer along the supply 
chain. 
The following are the performance metrics of the model: 
• τ , which represents the time to detection of a contamination event, originating at a 
supply chain node i  and being discovered through mode j ; 
•Ω, which represents the amount of contaminated stock in the case of a food 
contamination event originating at supply chain node i  and being discovered through 
mode j; 
•ω, denoting the amount of contaminated stock sold;  
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•γ, denoting the amount of contaminated stock that remains unsold (that is, in 
inventory) in the case of a food contamination event. 
The origin of contamination i  is defined as i = 1, if origin of contamination is at 
the supplier, and i = 2, if origin of contamination is at the processing center. The mode 
of detection  j is defined as j = 1 if mode of detection of the contamination event is 
through sampling at the supplier, j = 2 if mode of detection of the contamination event 
is through sampling at the processing center, j = 3 if mode of detection of the 
contamination event is through sampling one of the retailers and j = 4  if mode of 
detection is through food borne illness incidents. 
To perform the analysis, the time to detection, the amount of contaminated stock 
and the amount of sold and unsold stock are modeled for each mode of detection and for 
each origin of contamination. 
The contamination is assumed to be ongoing until it is discovered. This means 
that after a contamination is introduced at a location; all subsequent products that go 
through that location are contaminated as well. A quality control process such as 
cleaning of equipment, water used being changed etc. may however lead to the 
elimination of the source of contamination.  
In this model it is initially assumed that the entire system continues to operate 
unchanged, until the contamination is discovered and later on a quality control process 
which eradicates contamination is introduced. This helps in quantifying the complete 
impact of a contamination occurrence until its detection. Finally, for simplicity it is also 
assumed that sampling happens in zero time and is non-destructive by nature. The 
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sampling time will depend on the product and contamination type, however for 
simplicity it is assumed that sampling happens instantaneously. It is presumed that 
sampling reliably detects the contamination if a contamination is present. 
 
2.7. Impact of Origin and Mode of Detection of Contamination 
The impact of the origin of contamination and the mode of detection of 
contamination on the model and the associated costs to the supply chain in the event of a 
contamination are now analyzed. The timeline from the start of the contamination 
incident to the detection and initiation of the food recall event for each of the modes of 
detection of the food contamination event is modeled and the expected time to detection 
and the total contaminated stock is calculated. 
 
2.7.1. Origin at Supplier 
The supplier ships batches of raw material to the processing center. For the case 
of origin of contamination at the supplier without loss of generality, at time t = 0  the 
first batch of contaminated raw material is shipped from the supplier to the processing 
center. This batch reaches the processing center after the constant shipping lead time L. 
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Figure 3: Origin of contamination at supplier 
The cycle time of the item at the processing center CT$ is the sum of the queue 
time, the individual service time and the process time delay within a batch. The process 
time delay arises because on an average each item within a batch waits for the item(s) in 
front of it to be processed. The average wait time for a finished product in the finished 
goods inventory t( before being shipped to the retailer is determined by the safety 
stock at the processing center and the average demand fulfilled by the processing center. 
The position of a product entering the FGI is assumed to be uniformly distributed and 
due to flow conservation the amount of product entering the FGI is equal to the amount 
exiting the FGI. Similarly, the average time a product spends on a retailer shelf t  is 
determined by the safety stock at the retailer and the average demand fulfilled by the 
retailer.  
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The time line is chosen such that after the onset of contamination, when the first 
contaminated batch is assembled and shipped from the supplier time is set to t = 0  and 
henceforth it is referred to as the start time (Figure 3). 
 
2.7.2. Origin at Processing Center 
The processing center processes raw material received from the supplier into 
finished products. For origin of contamination at the processing center, it is assumed that 
the contamination is introduced at the end of processing of a particular batch, which is 
after the last product in that particular batch finishes processing.  
 
Figure 4: Origin of contamination at processing center 
Without loss of generality, at time t = 0  processing of the first batch begins after 
the introduction of contamination. The expected service time for each product is E	S
.  
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The contamination is assumed to last for the entire service duration time. This 
assumption is valid as the service time duration is much lower compared to the other 
time periods in our model such as the lead time l and incubation time T(. The time line 
is chosen such that, when the processing of the first batch begins after the introduction of 
contamination, the time is set to t = 0  and is referred to as the start time (Figure 4). 
 
2.7.3. Contamination Detection through Sampling 
The sampling strategy is a policy decision that is defined by the frequency with 
which a sample is taken. In real implementations, sampling strategies are derived from 
industry standards such as ISO 22000. There is literature available on the 
implementation of food safety systems as discussed in our initial review (Akkerman et 
al. 2010), (Tuominen et al. 2003), (Van Gerwen et al. 1997) and (Bertolini et al. 2007). 
The selected sampling strategy will also depend on the product type and the type of 
contamination which may occur that in turn will influence the severity of the food borne 
illness caused. However, we do not consider specific food safety management systems 
so as to be able to adapt it to different product types and food borne illnesses caused.  
In our model, we describe the frequency of sampling by the parameter , which 
is defined as the number of batches between successive samples. Thus, a high value of  
corresponds to infrequent sampling and a low value corresponds to frequent sampling. 
Sampling may be done at any of the nodes in the supply chain.  
It is assumed that a sampling strategy has been established such that a single item 
belonging to one batch in every N batches is sampled at the supplier. At the processing 
center, two sampling regimen are of interest, depending on whether we want to hedge 
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against potential contamination that originates either at the supplier, or at the processing 
center itself. If we want to detect contamination that originates at a supplier via 
sampling, we sample once every Nkm items arrive, finish processing and leave the FGI 
for the case of origin of contamination at the supplier. If we want to detect 
contamination that originates at the processing center, we sample one in every Nkm  
finished items. At the retailer, one in every Nkm items is sampled prior to being sold. 
The sampling will therefore be conducted in the following manner: 
1. At the supplier the time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed between the start time of the contamination until the time the  N4 
contaminated batch is assembled and shipped. 
2. At the processing center the time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed between the time the first contaminated batch arrives until the time the 
 (Nkm)4 product leaves the FGI for origin at the supplier. For origin at the processing 
center the time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly distributed between the time the 
first contaminated product enters the FGI until the time  (Nkm)4 product leaves the 
FGI. 
3. At any of r retailers the time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed between the time the first contaminated product arrives until the time the 
 (Nkm)4 product is sold. 
The results of the subsequent analysis are summarized in the following 
Proposition: 
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Proposition 2.7.3.1:  
1. If the contamination origin is at the supplier and contamination detection 
is through sampling, then the expected times to detection will be in the order:	
 >	G
 > 	
 and the expected amounts of contaminated stock will be in the 
order:	Ω
 > 	ΩG
 > 	Ω
.  
2. If the contamination origin is at the processing center and contamination 
detection is through sampling, then the expected times to detection will be in the 
order:	G
 > 	GG
, and the expected amounts of contaminated stock will be in the 
order:	ΩG
 > 	ΩGG
. 
3. The above results are true for any sampling strategy that is, any choice of 
N, that a company may adopt. 
 Proof: For origin of contamination at the supplier and, 
1. Sampling at supplier 
The time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly distributed between the time at which 
the first contaminated batch is assembled and shipped to the time at which the N4 
contaminated batch is assembled and shipped. Therefore, the sampling time Tl  will be 
a random variable uniformly distributed over the interval ¡0, (¢e))*'	1
 £. Since the N4 
batch will be shipped after time (¢e))*'	1
  from the start of contamination. The expected 
amount of contaminated stock produced in this case will be:  
E	Ω
 = E	D
E	Tl
                                                                                                          (2.14) 
2. Sampling at processing center  
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The time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly distributed between the time the first 
contaminated batch arrives until the time the (Nkm)4 product leaves the FGI. In this 
case the sampling TGl time can be assumed to be a random variable uniformly 
distributed over the interval¡L, L + (¢e))*'	1
 + CT$ + t(£, where CT$ is the cycle time of 
the item at the processing center and L  is the lead time from the supplier to the 
processing center. 
CT$ = uu − 1  E	S
 CcG(A!) + cG(S)2 K + k + 12  E	S
                                                        (2.15) 
cG	A!
 = ¤6	+,
'	+,
\    from equation (2.7). 
t( = OO¥¦¥a§¡1¨© ,2£jd	ª
\'	1
                                                                                                          (2.16)                                                                                     
The expected amount of contaminated stock will be: 
E	ΩG
 = E	D
E	TGl
                                                                                                              (2.17) 
3. Sampling at the retailer 
At each retailer the time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly distributed between the 
time the first contaminated product arrives until the time the (Nkm)4 product is sold. 
The first contaminated product will reach the retailer after time L + (¢e))*'	1
 + CT$ +
t( + l , the shelf time is t = OOb jdª\'	1
 , it will be purchased by the customer after time 
'	1
 if the retailer service level β2 = 1, however if β2 < 1 then there will be an 
additional delay of 
e¬b'	1
  before the first product is purchased. Therefore the 
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(Nkm)4 product will be purchased by the customer after time ¢)*'	1
 + ¢)*We¬b['	1
 =
¢)*WGe¬b['	1
  . The sampling time at retailer i , Th   will be a random variable uniformly 
distributed over the interval ­L + CT$ + t( + l, L + (¢e))*'	1
 + CT$ + t( + l +  ®¯@ +
¢)*WGe¬b['	1
 °. The time to detection of contamination through sampling at r  retailers will 
be the random variable, which will be the minimum among the sampling times at each 
retailerY = minThX, Tl\ , ⋯ , Tlb. If F²³h	Tl
 is the distribution of Tl the 
corresponding cdf of Y  will be, 
F´(y) = P(Y ≤ y) = minTlX , Tl\ , ⋯ , Tlb ≤ y
= 1 − PminTlX , Tl\ , ⋯ , Tlb > ¸
= 1 − PTlX > ¸, Tl\ > ¸, ⋯ , Tlb > ¸ = 1 − 	P(Tl > ¸)
= 1 − 	1 − 	P(Tl ≤ y)

= 1
− ¡1 −  F²³h	Tl
£                                                                               (2.18) 
 The expected time to detection of contamination through sampling at r  retailers will 
be E	Y
. The expected amount of contaminated stock will be:  
E	Ω
 = E	Y
(E	D
 + E	DG
+, ⋯ , +E	D
) = E	Y
E	D
                                        (2.19)     
The expected time to detection for each of the three cases above is: 
E	τ
 = E	Tl
 = (¢e))*G'	1
                                                                                               (2.20)       
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E	τG
 = E	TGl
 = Gj¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 j4²¾¿G                                                                           (2.21)        
E	τ
 = ETl =
GjG¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 jG4²¾¿jG7j 9À@j»g½W\¼Áb[dªG                                                                        (2.22)  
  for i = 1, ⋯ , r. Since N > 0  Â > 0 , t( > 0, 	S
 > 0. Ã > 0, l > 0, ¢)*WGe¬b['	1
 >0, CT$ > 0, Ä > 0, Å > 0 therefore, E	τ
 > 	τG
 > 	τ
                                                                                                       (2.23)  E	Ω
 > 	ΩG
 > 	Ω
                                                                                                    (2.24) 
Also the variances of the time to detection are: 
 Var	τ
 = Var	Tl
, Var	τG
 = Var	TGl
, Var	τ
 = Var	Tl
                           (2.25) 
For origin of contamination at the processing center, 
1. Sampling at the processing center  
The time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly distributed between the time the first 
batch after the onset of contamination starts processing until the time the (Nkm)4 
product leaves the FGI. The sampling time TG$  is a random variable, assumed to be 
uniformly distributed over the interval 	0, NkE	S
 + t(
.  The amount of stock to be 
recalled or to be investigated further will be 
 E	ΩG
 = E	D
E	TG$
                                                                                                            (2.26)  
2. Sampling at the retailer 
At the retailer the time of sampling is assumed to be uniformly distributed between the 
time the first contaminated product arrives until the time the (Nkm)4product is sold. 
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The first contaminated product will reach the retailer after time E	S
 + t( + l and the 
(Nkm)4product will be sold after time NkE	S
 + t( + l +  t + ¢)*WGe¬b['	1
  . The 
sampling time TG$  is assumed to be a random variable uniformly distributed over the 
interval ­E	S
 + t( + l, NkE	S
 + t( + l +  t + ¢)*WGe¬b ['	1
 Æ . The time to detection 
of contamination through sampling at r  retailers will be the random variable, which will 
be the minimum among the sampling times at each 
retailer Y = minThX , Tl\ ⋯ Tlb. If F²³º	T$
 is the distribution of T$ the 
corresponding cdf of Y  will be, 
F´(y) = P(Y ≤ y) = minT$X , T$\ , ⋯ , T$b ≤ y
= 1 − PminT$X , T$\ , ⋯ , T$b  > ¸
= 1 − PT$X > ¸, T$\ > ¸, ⋯ , T$b > ¸ = 1 − 	P(T$ > ¸)
= 1 − 	1 − 	P(T$ ≤ y)


= 1 − ¡1 −  F²³º	T$
£                                                                       (2.27) 
 The expected time to detection of contamination through sampling at r  retailers will 
be E	Y
. The expected amount of contaminated stock will be: 
E	ΩG
 = E	Y
(E	D
 + E	DG
+, ⋯ , +E	D
) = E	Y
E	D
                                         (2.28)     
The expected time to detection for each of the three cases above is: 
E	τGG
 = E	TG$
 = ¢)'	l
j4²¾¿G                                                                                             (2.29)       
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E	τG
 = ETl =
(¢)j)'	l
jG4²¾¿jG7j 4Çj»g½W\¼Áb[dªG                                                                                      (2.30)  
  for i = 1, ⋯  r , since N > 0  Â > 0 , tll > 0, 	S
 > 0. Ã > 0, l > 0, ¢)*WGe¬b['	1
 >0, Å > 0 therefore  
E	τG
 > 	τGG
                                                                                                                       (2.31) E	ΩG
 > 	ΩGG
                                                                                                                     (2.32) 
Also the variances of the time to detection are 
Var	τGG
 = Var	TG$
, Var	τG
 = VarT$                                                                    (2.33) 
This proposition shows that regardless of how often one chooses to sample, 
detection always takes longest (and the amount of inventory contaminated is always 
largest) when sampling at any of the retailers. Detection is quickest (and the amount 
affected is smallest) when sampling at the supplier (processing center) for the case of 
origin at the supplier (processing center). The benefit of sampling is always greatest 
when sampling is done closest to the actual location where the contamination occurred. 
Therefore, the location of sampling is more important than the sampling regimen 
a company or government agencies may adopt. This also implies that understanding 
where and with what probability contamination originates, should be of prime 
importance to the decision maker. 
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2.7.4. Contamination Detection through Food Borne Illnesses 
It is in the company and supply chain's interest to detect contamination before it 
leads to massive food borne illness outbreaks. Food recall investigations are initiated 
when a certain number of food borne illness incidents are reported and linked to a certain 
food product. It is assumed that a certain number T,  T ≥1, of illnesses have to be 
reported before a contamination can be discovered through food borne illness incidents.  
Lemma 2.7.4.1: The expected time to detection, variance of the time to detection and the 
expected contaminated stock for origin of contamination at the supplier and mode of 
detection through food borne illnesses in a multiple retailer supply chain is, 
	É
 = 	Ê
,STU	É
 = EG	Ê
, 	ΩÉ
 = 	=
	Ê
, where Ê =
ËTÌ ÍÎ, ÎG, ⋯ , ÎÏÐÑÒ° and the time of reporting of the food borne illness by the Ó9Ô 
customer is the random variable ÎÕ = ÖF + ×ØÕ, ÖFis the consumption time of the Ó9Ô 
consumer, Ó = 1 ⋯ Ï?ÙÒ, 
Ö?~ ÛÜÜ
ÜÝ^ÏÐÑÒÞ eßàn	o
 + Â + Ö×M + áF + ®âãØ +  ®¯@ + ÏÐÑÒWGeäå@[n	o@
 , ^
ÏÐÑÒÞ eßà
n	o
 + Â + Ö×M + Åæçç
çè
. 
The expected time to detection, variance of the time to detection and the contaminated 
stock for origin of contamination at the processing center and mode of detection through 
food borne illnesses is 	ÉG
 = 	Ê
,STU	ÉG
 = EG	Ê
, 	ΩÉG
 = 	=
	Ê
, where 
Ê = ËTÌ ÍÎ, ÎG, ⋯ , ÎÏÐÑÒ°and the time of reporting of the food borne illness by the Ó9Ô 
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customer is the random variable ÎÕ = ÖF + ×ØÕ, ÖFis the consumption time of the Ó9Ô 
consumer, Ó = 1, ⋯ , Ï?ÙÒ, 
Ö?~ éê×ëì 	í
 + áF + ®âãØ +  ®¯@ + Ï
×ëÒ 2 − LH@	=F
 , ê×ëì 	í
 + Åî. 
 for  ï = 1, ⋯ , U, × ≥ 1. 
Proof: For origin of contamination at the supplier, for T customers to show the 
symptoms, expected number of customers required to purchase and consume the 
products isÏðÒ . The WÏðÒ [4product after the introduction of contamination will be sold 
after time ^
Ï©ñÒg e)*
'	1
 + L + CT$ + t( + l +  t + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b ['	1
 . As before we assume X to 
be the time between the purchase of the WÏðÒ [4  product by a customer and the end of 
its shelf life, where 
Ï©ñÒ)  gives the batch number to which WÏðÒ [4the product belongs. The 
time of consumption of the product by the WÏðÒ [4 customer is a random variable CÏ©ñÒ 
which is uniformly distributed between 
ÛÜÜ
ÜÝ^Ï©ñÒg e)*'	1
 + L + CT$ + t( + l +  t +
Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 , ^
Ï©ñÒg e)*
'	1
 + L + CT$ + t( + l +  t + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 + X æçç
çè
 , where X = H −
46 
 
Ct( + l +  t + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b ['	1
 K.  Then the expected time at which the  WÏðÒ [4customer 
shows symptoms of disease after consumption of the contaminated product will be 
E ÍCÏ©ºÒ + T(° and the variance will beVar ÍCÏ©ºÒ + T(°. The time of reporting of the food 
borne illness by the  n4 customer is the random variable Z = C + T(, C is the 
consumption time of the  n4 consumer.  Z  are ÏðÒ   independent identically distributed 
random variables (iid) for n = 1, ⋯ , ÏðÒ . It is to be noted that the time of consumption 
may not be in the order of purchase of the product. Let the time at which the   WÏðÒ [4 
illness is reported be the random variable, which will be the maximum among the 
reporting times of each of the ÏðÒ   customersY = Max ÍZ, ZG, ⋯ , ZÏ©ñÒ° . If Fõ(z) is the 
distribution of, then the corresponding cdf of Y  will beF´(y) = P ÍZ ≤ y, ZG ≤
y, ⋯ , ZÏ©ñÒ ≤ y° = 	Fõ(y)
Ï©ñÒ. The expected time at which T  cases will be reported 
is E	Y
 = E öMax ÍZ, ZG, ⋯ , ZÏ©ñÒ°÷. The contaminated stock to be investigated or 
destroyed after the reporting of  ÏðÒ cases of the disease will be E	ΩÉ
 = E	D
E	Y
. The 
expected time to detection  E	τÉ
 = E	Y
 and the variance of the time to 
detection Var	τÉ
 = Var	Y
.  
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For origin of contamination at the processing center, the WÏðÒ [4product after the 
introduction of contamination will be sold after time ÏðÒ E	S
 + t( + l +  t +
Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 . As before we assume X to be the time between the purchase of the WÏðÒ [4  
product by a customer and the end of its shelf life. The time of consumption of the 
product by the WÏðÒ [4 customer is a random variable CÏ©ñÒ which is uniformly distributed 
between ­ÏðÒ E	S
 + tll + l + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 , ÏðÒ E	S
 + t( + l +  t + Ï©ñÒWGe¬ø ['	1
 + X Æ 
where X = H − Ct( + l +  t + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 K.  Then the expected time at which the 
 WÏðÒ [4customer shows symptoms of disease after consumption of the contaminated 
product will be E ÍCÏ©ºÒ + T(° and the variance will beVar ÍCÏ©ºÒ + T(°. The time of 
reporting of the food borne illness by the  n4 customer is the random variable Z = C +
T(, C is the consumption time of the  n4 consumer.  Z  are ÏðÒ   independent 
identically distributed random variables (iid) for n = 1, ⋯ , ÏðÒ . It is to be noted that the 
time of consumption may not be in the order of purchase of the product. Let the time at 
which the   WÏðÒ [4 illness is reported be the random variable, which will be the 
maximum among the reporting times of each of the ÏðÒ 
customersY = Max ÍZ, ZG, ⋯ , ZÏ©ñÒ° . If Fõ(z) is the distribution of, then the 
48 
 
corresponding cdf of Y  will beF´(y) = P ÍZ ≤ y, ZG ≤ y, ⋯ , ZÏ©ñÒ ≤ y° = 	Fõ(y)
Ï©ñÒ. 
The expected time at which T  cases will be reported is E	Y
 = E öMax ÍZ, ZG, ⋯ , ZÏ©ñÒ°÷. 
The contaminated stock to be investigated or destroyed after the reporting of  ÏðÒ cases 
of the disease will be E	ΩÉG
 = E	D
E	Y
. The expected time to detection  E	τÉG
 = E	Y
 
and the variance of the time to detection Var	τÉG
 = Var	Y
.  
The following proposition shows under what circumstances the expected time to 
detection through food borne illness will be greater than through sampling efforts. This 
allows the selection of an appropriate sampling strategy if we want to detect the food 
contamination through sampling and preempt detection through food borne illnesses. 
Ideally, a company will want to sample less frequently (i.e., use a sampling strategy with 
a low N) to keep sampling costs at a minimum. Thus, we would like to find the least-
frequent sampling strategy that can still - in expectation - provide contamination 
detection before a food borne illness incident is raised. Firstly, the following sampling 
strategy parameters are defined: 
N = 2 ùÏTpÒk − 1ú + E	D
km ù2L + 2CTð + t( + l +  t + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T(ú
+ 1                                                                                                              (2.34) 
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G = ùÏTpÒk − 1ú + E	D
km ùCTð + l +  t + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T(ú
+ 1                                                                                                                 (2.35) 
N = E	D
E	D
 + E	D
(2 − β) 2 ù
ÏTpÒk − 1ú
+ E	D
km ùÏ
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T( − t( − l −  tú
+ 1                                                                                                                (2.36) 
NÉ = 1kE	S
 ù2E	S
 êTpì + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T( + l
+  t]                                                                                                       (2.37) 
Nû = E	D
kE	S
E	D
 + km2 − β2 ù2E	S
 êTpì +
ÏTpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T( − t(
− l− t − E	S
]                                                                             (2.38) 
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Proposition 2.7.4.2:  
1. If contamination origin is at the supplier, then when sampling takes place 
at location ï (ï = 1: supplier, ï = 2: processing center,ï = 3: retailer), a sampling 
strategy can preempt detection through a food borne illness illness for any  < F .  
2. If contamination origin is at the processing center, then when sampling 
takes place at location ï  (ï = 4: processing center,ï = 5: retailer), a sampling strategy 
can preempt detection through a food borne illness illness for any  < F .  
3.  > G > .  
4. É > û.  
Proof: From Lemma 2.7.4.1, for origin at the supplier, E	τÉ
 = E ÍCÏ©ñÒ° + E	T(
  for 
ÏðÒ customers purchasing and consuming the product for T customers to report an illness. 
C~
ÛÜ
ÜÜÜ
ÜÝ^ÏTpÒk − 1 km
E	D
 + L + CT$ + l + t( +  ®¯@ + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 ,
^ÏTpÒk − 1 km
E	D
 + L
+ CT$ + Hæçç
çè                                                                                                                                (2.39) 
51 
 
E	τÉ

=
2 ^ÏTpÒk − 1 kmE	D
 + 2L + 2CT$ + l + t( +  t + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T(2           (2.40) 
The expected time to detection through sampling at the different nodes is given in 
Proposition 2.7.3.1.The different expected times to detection can now be compared to 
obtain the condition under which the expected time to detection through sampling will 
be lesser then the expected time through food borne illnesses. 
1. Sampling at supplier  
E	τ
 = (¢e))*G'	1
 , let N = Max(N), forE	τÉ
 > 	τ
,   
The condition which defines the sampling strategy will be: 
N < 2 ùÏTpÒk − 1ú + E	D
km ù2L + 2CTð + t( + l +  t + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T(ú
+ 1                                                                                                            (2.41) 
2. Sampling at the processing center  E	τG
 = Gj¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 j4²¾¿G  , let NG = Max(N), for E	τÉ
 > 	τG
 
 The condition which defines the sampling strategy will be: 
N < 2 ùÏTpÒk − 1ú + E	D
km ùCTð + l +  t + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T(ú
+ 1             (2.42) 
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3. Sampling at the retailer E	τ
 = GjG¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 jG4²¾¿jG7j 4Çj»g½W\¼Áb[dªG  , 
let N = Max(N), for E	τÉ
 > 	τ
 
The condition which defines the sampling strategy will be: 
N < E	D
E	D
 + E	D
(2 − β) 2 ù
ÏTpÒk − 1ú
+ E	D
km ùÏ
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T( − t( − l −  tú + 1              (2.43) 
Comparing N, NG as L > 0, tOO > 0, therefore N > NG especially for long lead times. 
Comparing NG, N, 2 CÏ©ñÒ) − 1K + '	1
)* CÏ©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 + H + 2T( − t( − l −  tK + 1 <
2 CÏ©ñÒ) − 1K + '	1
)* CCTð + l +  t + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 + H + 2T(K + 1             as t(, CT$ > 0 
and inN , '	1
'	1
j'	1
(Ge¬ø ) < '	1
'	1
 = 1, therefore N < NG  and N > NG > N. 
For origin at the processing center, E	τÉG
 = E ÍCÏ©ñÒ° + E	T(
  for ÏðÒ customers 
purchasing and consuming the product for T customers to report an illness.  
C~ éêTpì E	S
 + l + t( +  t + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 , êTpì E	S
 + Hî                                 (2.44) 
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E	τÉG

= 2 ÏTpÒ E	S
 + l + t( +  t +
ÏTpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T(2                                      (2.45) 
Now the different expected times to detection can be compared to obtain the 
condition under which the expected time to detection through sampling will be lesser 
then the expected time through food borne illnesses. 
1. Sampling at processing center E	τGG
 = ¢)'	l
j4²¾¿G  , let NÉ = Max(N), for E	τÉG
 > 	τG
, 
  The condition which defines the sampling strategy will be:  
N < 1kE	S
 ù2E	S
 êTpì + Ï
TpÒ 2 − βE	D
 +  t + H + 2T( + lú                                (2.46) 
2. Sampling at the retailer E	τG
 = (¢)j)'	l
jG4²¾¿jG7j 4Çj»g½W\¼Áb[dªG , let Nû = Max(N), for E	τÉG
 > 	τG
, 
the condition which defines the sampling strategy will be: 
N < E	D
kE	S
E	D
 + km2 − β2 ù2E	S
 êTpì +
ÏTpÒ 2 − βE	D
 + H + 2T( − t( − l
−  t − E	S
]                                                                                              (2.47) 
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 Comparing NÉ, Nû  C2E	S
 ÏðÒ + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 + H + 2T( − t( − l −  t −
E	S
i <  ^2E	S
 ÏðÒ + Ï©ñÒWGe¬b['	1
 + H + 2T( +  t + l     as tOO > 0, 	S
 > 0,  also 
'	1
)'	l
'	1
j)*WGe¬b[ < '	1
)'	l
'	1
 = ü'	l
   as km2 − β > 0 ®ℎþUþUþ NÉ > Nû. 
The preceding proposition gives the least frequent sampling strategy that a 
company can adopt to keep sampling costs at a minimum and still preempt detection by 
customer reports of food borne illnesses. This Proposition also shows that one can afford 
to sample less frequently when doing it at the supplier, especially with long lead times 
from the grower to the processing center. Similarly, one can sample less frequently at the 
processing center as compared to sampling at the retailer.  
In the following Proposition the mode of detection of contamination is held 
constant. The performance metrics are then compared across the different origins of 
contamination to derive conditions under which the impact of contamination will be 
most significant. 
Proposition 2.7.4.3: For a given mode of detection of contaminated stock, the expected 
time to detection and the expected amount of contaminated stock are most when the 
origin of contamination is at the supplier as opposed to the processing center when: 
1. 2Â + Ö×M + (e)ßàn	o
 − Ã	í
 > 1 (when sampling at processing 
center), For  ≫ 1 the condition reduces to2Â + Ö×M + ßà(e)n	o
 , where  is the 
utilization factor.  
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2. 2Â + Ö×M + (e)ßàn	o
 − (Ã + 1)	í
 > 1 (when sampling at retailer), 
For  ≫ 1  the condition reduces to2Â + 2Ö×M + ßàn	o
 (1 − ) > 1. 
3. Â + Ö×M − ßàn	o
 + Ï?ÙÒ àn	o
 (1 − ) > 1 (Food borne illness). 
Proof:  
1. Sampling at processing center, E	τG
 = Gj¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 j4²¾¿G  and E	τGG
 =
¢)'	l
j4²¾¿G  , E	τG
 > 	τGG
  if  
2L + CT$ + (N − 1)kmE	D
 − NkE	S
 > 1                                                                              (2.48) 
for N ≫ 1 we assume N − 1 ≅ N and u = '	l
'	1
*  the above condition reduces to 
 2L + CT$ + ¢)*(e)'	1
 > 1                                                                                          (2.49)   
2. Sampling at retailer, 
 E	τ
 = GjG¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 jG4²¾¿jG7j 4Çj»g½\¼ÁbdªG  
and E	τG
 = (¢)j)'	l
jG4²¾¿j 4ÇjG7j»g½W\¼Áø[dªG , E	τ
 > 	τG
 if 
2L + CT$ + (N − 1)kmE	D
 − (Nk + 1)E	S
 > 1                                                                  (2.50)  
for N ≫ 1 we assume N − 1 ≅ N and u = '	l
'	1
*  the condition reduces to 
2L + 2CT$ + NkmE	D
 (1 − u) > 1                                                                                           (2.51) 
3. Food borne illness, 
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 E	τÉ
 =
\^Ï©ñÒg ¼Xg½
d	ª
 jGjG¹ºj7j4²¾¿j4ÇjÏ©ñÒW\¼Áb[dª jjG¿	G   and E	τÉG
 =
GÏ©ñÒ'	l
j7j4²¾¿j 4ÇjÏ©ñÒW\¼Áb[dª jjG¿	G  for T customers reporting, E	τÉ
 > 	τÉG
 if 
 
L + CT$ − )*'	1
 + ÏðÒ *'	1
 (1 − u) > 1                                                                                 (2.52) 
This Proposition shows that for a realistic sampling strategy at the processing 
center or any of the retailers, where N ≫ 1, the impact of contamination is highest when 
the origin is at the supplier as opposed to the processing center. This is because the 
conditions in the Proposition hold as the terms on the left hand side are positive, and for 
all practical purposes one can assume L ≥ 1, in particular for global supply chains. A 
moderately frequent or a fairly infrequent sampling strategy with N ≫ 1 can be assumed 
in most cases because too frequent sampling results in a prohibitively high cost of 
sampling. 
 
2.8. Quality Control Process 
Consider the implementation of a quality control process (such as equipment 
clean up, water change etc.) which is assumed to eradicate the contamination. This 
process can occur at the supplier or the processing center and negates the earlier 
assumption of an ongoing contamination. It is also assumed that the quality control 
process takes place in zero time once every Q∗ batches after the start of contamination. 
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Therefore on implementation of the quality control process the number of contaminated 
batches will be  Q∗(when a contamination occurs). 
For the scenario where origin of contamination is at the supplier or the 
processing center, in the absence of a quality control process the contamination will be 
ongoing. The number of contaminated batches Q for detection through a food borne 
illness can be calculated from Proposition 2.7.4.1. If there is a quality control process in 
place the number of contaminated batches will be Q∗  . Now we analyze the following 
options: 
1. Q∗ < : In this case, either the contaminated stock is entirely in the 
supply chain (and has not been sold to customers), or some amount of product has 
reached the consumers. However, in this worst case, the amount that has reached 
consumers is less than the critical amount that would raise a food borne illness outbreak 
event. This situation is similar to the scenario of contamination detection through 
sampling in the absence of a quality control process discussed above. 
2. Q∗ ≥ Q: The A food borne illness outbreak event will take place prior to 
the quality control process being able to rectify the problem. In this case, the 
implementation of the quality control process appears redundant, if we assume that upon 
a food borne illness outbreak, processing and sale of the affected products will be halted 
anyway. 
Under this assumption, it is only sensible to implement the quality control 
process if the process is such that Q∗ < . We now evaluate the total budget that 
necessary for implementing such a process. Let C be the total annual budget that has to 
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be allocated by the company for quality control so that they can meet the 
requirement Q∗ < . The cost C is now evaluated in terms of the known model 
parameters. Let c be the cost per quality control process taking place and E	D
 be 
expected annual demand. 
Proposition 2.8.1: The minimum cost per time period of a quality control process which 
will eradicate contamination prior to a food borne illness outbreak isÖ > n	o
ßà . 
 Proof: The number of quality control processes taking place per year as decided by the 
total budget is ¹. The number of batches processed per time period will be '	1
)* . A 
quality control process will take place once every Q∗ batches where, 
 Q∗ = d	ª
g½                                                                                                                                   (2.53)  
Since Q∗ <  , therefore 
  C > '	1
¹)*                                                                                                                 (2.54) 
where E	D
 is the expected annual demand.                                  
This proposition suggests that if a company cannot dedicate at least a budget of 
  C  to a quality control regimen, then it should not employ quality control at all. This is 
of managerial interest, because it shows that the benefits from quality control (in terms 
of contamination health scare avoidance) are decidedly not linear in the effort and 
money spent on quality control; rather there is a threshold of quality control effort below 
which there is no impact at all. 
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2.9. Cost of Contamination 
In the event of a product contamination, the cost of contamination will be higher 
depending on the number of products affected and the number of consumers of the 
product (Lippincott 2008). Together, these factors determine what is called the “direct 
cost” of the contamination event. This direct cost consists of the cost of destroying the 
unsold contaminated stock, recalling the sold contaminated stock, and the cost associated 
with lost sales during the recall period.  
As opposed to the direct cost, the “indirect costs” of a food contamination event 
are the liability, medical costs and the costs of deteriorating brand value and negative 
reputation effects (Golan 2003), (Lippincott 2008), (Golan, Krissoff et.al. 2004), 
(Ollinger and Ballenger 2003). While these indirect costs (especially through litigation 
and reputation effects) may in some cases be higher than the direct costs, they are 
typically hard to quantify directly.  
In this research, it is chosen to model the indirect costs as a consequence of the 
scale of the food contamination event. In essence, the larger the scale of the food 
contamination event as measured by the amount of product (sold or unsold) affected, and 
the time to detection of the contamination event, the greater are the resulting indirect 
costs likely to be. For example, if one considers only the medical costs, then the higher 
the number of contaminated products sold, the higher the number of customers reporting 
illnesses and filing medical claims is likely to be. Now a general expression for the total 
cost incurred due to the food contamination incident is derived. The total expected cost 
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of a contamination event C5467(i, j) is the sum total of the expected direct and expected 
indirect costs:  
C5467(i, j) = C1(i, j) + C((i, j)                                                                                              (2.55)    
where j = 1, ⋯ ,4 for i = 1,2 for different cases of origins and modes of detection of 
contamination. The direct costs incurred due to the food contamination event are the 
following: 
1. The cost of destroying the contaminated safety stock if it is in the 
inventory or refunding the customer if it is sold. 
2. The loss of sales during the time taken from opening to closure of the 
recall case under criterion agreed upon by the FSIS and the firms in the supply chain 
(Teratanavat et. al. 2005). The FSIS is the Food Safety and Inspection service of the 
United States Agricultural Department (USDA) and is responsible for the safety of food 
products. The time taken to close the recall case can be assumed to be a function of the 
contaminated stock (sold and unsold). This is because as the amount of contaminated 
stock produced increases the amount of sold or unsold stock will also increase. In turn, 
longer will be the timeframe required to conduct retrieval of the stock and close the 
recall case. 
Let Ω denote the total contaminated stock, ω  denote the amount of sold 
contaminated stock and γ denote the amount of unsold contaminated stock. Then the 
expected direct cost will be C1(i, j):  
C1(i, j) = cEγ + rEω + rE	D
Tω, γ                                                                   (2.56)   
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where  E	D
 is the expected demand during one period, T is the time taken to close the 
recall case, c  is manufacturing cost per item and r  is the retail cost per item. The time 
taken to close the recall case is assumed to be a function of the sold and unsold 
contaminated stock, since the greater the amount of contaminated stock, the longer will 
be the time required to track it. 
The indirect costs are modeled by taking as proxies the amount of contaminated 
inventory. Then, the expected indirect cost will be a function of the total contaminated 
stock and amount of contaminated stock sold: 
C((i, j) = F Ω , ω                                                                                                                (2.57) 
such that  Ω ≥ 0,   ≥ 0. 
Proposition 2.9.1: The expected amount of sold and unsold contaminated stock at the 
expected time to detection of the food contamination event for the different origins and 
modes of detection of contamination is: 
1. Origin at supplier  
 =




ÛÜÜ
ÜÜ − fÖ×M + Â + ®âãØ+ ®¯@ + áF − Ã	=
iÄ	=
 + 2 − LH@	=F
 æçç
çç ,
 ï  − fÖ×M + Â + ®âãØ + + ®¯@ + áF − Ã	=
iÄ	=
 + (2 − LH@)	=F
 > 00,  ®ℎþU ï8þ
!
 
for " = 1 ⋯ 4. 
2. Origin at processing center  
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G = 
ÛÜÜ
ÜG − ®âãØ + áF+ ®¯@ 	í
 + (2 − LH@)	=F
 æç
çç , ï G − ®âãØ + áF+ ®¯@	í
 + (2 − LH)	=F
 > 00,  ®ℎþU ï8þ
!
 
for " = 2 ⋯ 4, 
andF = #F − $F. 
Proof:   
1. Origin supplier 
The N4 contaminated product will be sold at time W»g e[)*'	1
 + L + CT$ + t(+ ®¯@ + l +
¢(Ge¬b)'	1
 . At the time to detection Eτ the expected amount of contaminated stock will 
be  
Eω
=




ÛÜÜ
ÜÜEτ − fCT$ + L + t( + l + + ®¯@ − kE	D
imE	D
 + 2 − βE	D
 æçç
çç ,
 if Eτ − fCT$ + L + t( + l+ ®¯@ − kE	D
imE	D
 + (2 − β)E	D
 > 0                                                 (2.58)0,  ®ℎþU ï8þ
!
 
Otherwise Eω = 0 for j = 1 ⋯ 4 as the amount of stock cannot be negative 
2. Origin processing center 
The N4 contaminated product will be sold at time NE	S
 + t( + l+ ®¯@ + ¢(Ge¬b)'	1
 . At 
the time to detection EτG the expected amount of contaminated stock will be  
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EωG
=

ÛÜÜ
ÜEτG − t( + l+ ®¯@E	S
 + (2 − β)E	D
 æç
çç , if EτG − t( + l+ ®¯@E	S
 + (2 − β)E	D
 > 00,  ®ℎþU ï8þ
!                           (2.59) 
Otherwise EωG = 0 for j = 2 ⋯ 4 as the amount of stock cannot be negative. Since the 
total contaminated stock is the sum of the sold and unsold contaminated stock 
Eω = EΩ − Eγ                                                                                                            (2.60) 
 
2.10. Cost of Sampling 
For the scenario where the mode of detection of contamination is through 
sampling the additional cost of sampling can also be considered. The cost of sampling 
will depend on the sampling strategy, increasing as the sampling is done more frequently 
and decreasing as the sample is done less frequently. The annual cost of sampling is 
defined as Cl(N). According to the present sampling strategy in the model, we sample 
once in every N  batches or once in every Nkm  items, where k  and m  are constant for a 
given product. The total cost of contamination in this case will be: 
C5467(i, j) = C1(i, j) + C((i, j) +  Cl(N)                                                                            (2.61)  
For example, in the case where we sample once in every N  batches, if we 
consider the annual demand rate to be E	D
 , the total number of batches produced in a 
single year will be '	1
)* . The number of samples per year will be '	1
¢)*. The a priori 
probability of contamination occurring during a single year is assumed to be q. The 
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probability of no contamination during the year will therefore be (1 − q). The unit cost 
of sampling is assumed to be cl. The annual cost of the number of unsuccessful samples 
will be 
 Cl(N) = '	1
¢)* (1 − q)cl                                                                                                         (2.62)  
 
 
2.11. Varying Number of Retailers 
The impact of the supply chain structure, and in particular the number of retailers 
in the supply chain on the performance metrics in event of a product contamination is 
now investigated.  
It is assumed that initially the overall product demand described by random 
variable D and standard deviation σ	D
 is aggregated at a single retailer. As the number 
of retailers increase demand is distributed among them such that, D = ∑ D for i = 1, ⋯ , r,  where D is the customer demand at each of the retailers. It is also assumed 
that the expected demand and standard deviation of demand are the same at each retailer 
since the aim is to compare the impact of contamination on the supply chain and we 
want to avoid bias towards any of the retailers. The processing center now needs to 
fulfill demand D.  
We are interested whether and how the time to detection and the amount of 
contaminated product vary when the number of retailers is varied. Note that if the 
number of retailers decreases, then each retailer needs to satisfy a larger portion of the 
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total demand, which stays constant. The following Proposition analyzes the variation in 
the safety stock as the number of retailers varies in the supply chain. 
Proposition 2.11.1: The total safety stock and the time for the safety stock to be sold at 
the processing center increases as the number of retailers increase. 
Proof: As stated in Lemma 2.4.1, the safety stock is determined by two factors (1) the 
variability in the customer demand at each retailer and (2) the variability in the 
replenishment rate of the FGI at the processing center.  
 It is first proved that the variability due to the replenishment rate the same as the 
number of retailers increase. Consider, two supply chains with j and k  retailers 
respectively such that < Ã . The coefficient of variation for the replenishment process 
CV2  in both the cases can be assumed to be equal, as the processing centers in both 
supply chains have identical queuing processes in place. The parameters for the supply 
chain with j retailers is denoted by the suffix j  and the parameters for the case of k  
retailers is denoted by the suffix k. The coefficient of variation for the two cases is: 
CV2 = &	2
'	2
 = &	2
'	1
                                                                                                       (2.63) 
CV)2 = σ	R
)E	R
    σ	R
E	D
                                                                                                              (2.64) 
as E	R
 = E	D
 
E	R
 = E	D
 = E∑ D  = ∑ E	D
 = ∑ E	D
                                               (2.65) 
As the demand at each retailer D is independent of each other 
CV2 = &	2
g∑ '	1
g'X , CV2 = CV)2                                                                                    (2.66) 
66 
 
Hence σ	R
 = σ	R
)                                                                                                              (2.67) 
Now the variability due to the demand process in the two cases is analyzed to 
arrive at a relationship between the safety stocks. Consider the stock at r retailers being 
consolidated at a single retailer. At the single retailer,E	D
 = ∑ E	D
 ,  
σ	D
 = D∑ σGD = DrσGD = √rσD                                            (2.68) 
This is due to risk pooling. The safety stock at the processing center for the case 
of a single retailer from Lemma 2.4.1 will be: 
ss45467	D, R
 = z ù)*σ	D
G  + σ	R
OGú                                                       (2.69) 
For the supply chain with r retailers the safety stock at the processing center will be: 
¡ss45467D , R£ = z CDrG σDG +  σ	R
OG K                                                     (2.70)                                    
Therefore as the numbers of retailers r increase and 
 
ss45467	D, R
 ≤ ss45467	D, R
                                                                       (2.71) 
Now the performance metrics can be compared as the numbers of the retailers in 
the supply chain vary. 
Proposition 2.11.2:  
1. When sampling at the supplier, the expected time to detection and the 
expected amount of contaminated stock remain the same as the number of retailers 
varies. 
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2. For all other modes of detection, the expected time to detection and the 
expected amount of contaminated stock increase as the number of retailers increase. 
Proof: 
1. The expected time to detection and the expected amount of contaminated 
stock will be the same for the supply chain as the number of retailers vary for detection 
through sampling at the supplier. The expected time to detection is E	τ
 = (¢e))*G'	1
     
and the expected amount of contaminated stock is E	Ω
 = E	τ
E	D
 from Proposition 
2.7.3.1. 
2. The expected time to detection will be E	τG
 = Gj¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 j4²¾¿G     for 
detection through sampling at the processing center as the number of retailers varies. 
The expected amount of contaminated stock will be 	ΩG
 = E	τG
E	D
 . The time for the 
FGI stock to be sold t( = OO¥¦¥a§¡1¨© ,2£jd	ª
\'	1
           increases as the number of retailers 
increase, therefore the expected time to detection and the expected amount of 
contaminated stock will also increase as the number of retailers increase, given that all 
other parameters are the same. 
3. The expected time to detection will be 
E	τ
 = GjG¹ºj(»¼X)g½d	ª
 jG4²¾¿jG7j4Çj»g½W\¼Áb[dªG   for i = 1, ⋯ , r  for detection through 
sampling at a retailer, and the expected amount of contaminated stock is E	Ω
 =E	τ
E	D
. 
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4. The expected time to detection will be 
E	τÉ
 =
\^Ï©ñÒg ¼Xg½
d	ª
 jGjG¹ºj7j4²¾¿j4ÇjÏ©ñÒW\¼Áb[dª jjG¿	G  for i = 1, ⋯ , r  for detection 
through a food borne illness, and the expected amount of contaminated stock is E	ΩÉ
 =E	τÉ
E	D
. 
The components which contribute to the expected time to detection and are different for 
each of these cases are:  
1) The time for the FGI to be sold which increases as the number of retailers 
increase and hence will contribute to an increase in the expected time to detection.  
2) The time the product spends on the retailer shelf t = OObjdª\'	1
 =
+&1¨©'	1
 + G = +&	1¨©
√'	1
 , where z is the standardized value corresponding to the retailer 
service level.  As the number of retailers increase t also increases. 
3) The time after which the product will be purchased by the customer once 
it reaches the retailer, this will be 
Ï©ñÒWGe¬b ['	1
   for the case of which also increases as the 
number of retailers increase as the amount of demand fulfilled by each retailer E	D
 
decreases. 
Therefore, the expected time to detection and the expected amount of 
contaminated stock will also increase as the number of retailers’ increase, for detection 
through sampling at a retailer or through a food borne illness. The results of Proposition 
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2.11.1 are for origin at the supplier, similar results can also be proved for origin at the 
processing center.  
Thus, the performance metrics remain the same irrespective of the number of 
retailers in the supply chain for detection through sampling at the supplier. The 
performance metrics are higher (that is, worsen) the more retailers the supply chain has, 
for all other modes of detection. This behavior is mainly due to risk pooling when 
demand is consolidated at a single location. In addition, the amount of safety stock and 
the time for the safety stock to be sold at the processing center also increases as the 
number of retailers increase leading to an increase in the performance metrics. 
This finding implies that in a highly arborescent supply chain with many 
retailers, the time required to close a recall case will be longer, because the length of the 
recall period will depend on the total amount of contaminated stock as well as the 
location and spread of the stock. As the number of retailers increase the contaminated 
stock will be distributed or spread out at more number of retailers and its customers as 
opposed to the spread when there are fewer retailers. Therefore, an otherwise identical 
sampling strategy implemented at the processing center or a retailer will result in 
contamination being detected faster for a supply chain with fewer retailers, as compared 
to a supply chain with a larger number of retailers. Simplicity in supply chain structure 
benefits contamination detection in this case. 
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2.12. Comparison of Product Attributes and Supply Chain Properties 
A sensitivity analysis is performed to study the impact of the input parameters on 
the output of the model, the total contaminated stock  Ω and the time to detection τ. 
The test is conducted for all the cases of origin of contamination and modes of detection 
of the contamination and the results were similar. The results below are for a specific 
case where origin is at the supplier and detection is through a food borne illness. The 
results for all cases can also be proved similarly and will result in the same conclusion.  
Proposition 2.12.1: Regardless of the origin of the contamination and the mode of 
detection, the expected amount of contaminated stock  	#F 
  and the expected time to 
detection 	F
  vary as follows: 
1. An increase in the incubation time ×ØÕ results in an increase in  	#F 
 and 
	F 
.   
2. An increase in the lead time from the supplier to the processing center á  
results in an increase in  	#F 
 and 	F
.   
3. An increase in the lead time from the processing center to the retailer 
Â results in an increase in  	#F 
  and 	F
.   
4. An increase in the shelf life of the product Å  results in an increase in 
 	#F 
  and 	F 
.   
5. An increase in the number of batches after which the sampling is 
periodically conducted (sampling strategy)   will result in an increase in  	#F 
  and 
	F 
.   
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6. An increase in the number of customers ×  having to report a food borne 
illness before a food borne illness scare is recorded will result in increase in  	#F 
  and 
	F 
.   
7. An increase in the probability ë  of a customer contracting a food borne 
illness on consuming the contaminated product results in a decrease in  	#F 
  and 
	F 
 
  Proof:  
1. ,-.X,¿	 = 1, ,Ω.X,¿	 =E	D
                                                                                                 (2.74)  
Which are positive as  E	D
 > 0, therefore as T( increases τÉ, ΩÉ increase. 
2. ,-.X, = 1, ,Ω.X, =E	D
                                                                                                    (2.75)  
Which are positive as  E	D
 > 0, therefore as L increases τÉ , ΩÉ increase. 
3. ,-.X,7 = G , ,Ω.X,7 =
'	1
 G                                                                                                     (2.76)  
Which are positive as  E	D
 > 0, therefore as l increases τÉ , ΩÉ increase. 
4. ,-.X, = G , ,Ω.X, =
'	1
G                                                                                                      (2.77)  
Which are positive as  E	D
 > 0, therefore as H increases τÉ, ΩÉ increase. 
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5. ,-.X, = *ð'	1
 − ¬b eGGð'	1
 , ,Ω.X, =
E	D
 W *ð'	1
 − ¬beGGð'	1
[                                            (2.78)  
Which are positive as  E	D
 > 0, ë > 0, Ä > 0, β2 ≤ 1 therefore as T increases τÉ , ΩÉ 
increase. 
6. ,-.X,¢ = )*G'	1
 , ,Ω.X,¢ =
E	D
 )*G'	1
                                                                                    (2.79)  
Which are positive as  E	D
 > 0, Ã > 0, Ä > 0 therefore as N increases τÉ, ΩÉ increase. 
7. ,-.X,ð =, ,Ω.X,$ =
E	D
                                                                                                       (2.80)  
Which are positive as  E	D
 > 0, therefore as p increases τÉ , ΩÉ increase. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis as shown in Proposition 2.12.1 are recorded 
in Table 1. An increase in the output parameters on increasing the input parameters is 
denoted by "+" and a decrease in the output parameters on increasing the input 
parameters is denoted by "-". 
Beyond these basic sensitivity results, it is also of interest to determine when 
sampling strategies are more effective than the strategy of waiting for customer reports 
of illnesses. To this end, the difference between expected time to detection for the mode 
of detection through food borne illnesses and detection through sampling is evaluated: 
∆= EτÉ  − Eτ, where j = 1,2,3  for i = 1  and j= 2,3  for i = 2 . The higher this 
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difference is, the greater will be the benefit from sampling as compared to waiting for 
customer reports. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the impact of product attributes on the relative benefit from 
a sampling approach. In these tables, higher values of the product attributes are denoted 
by the symbol ◆, and lower values are denoted by the symbol ◇. Cases in which no 
conclusion can be drawn about the values of these product attributes are denoted by 
“varies” in the tables. 
Table 1: Comparison of product attributes and detection policies 
Input parameters Amount of contaminated 
stock 
Time to 
detection 
Incubation time + + 
Lead time from supplier to processing 
center 
+ + 
Lead time from processing center to 
retailer 
+ + 
Shelf life + + 
Sampling strategy + + 
Number of customers reporting a food 
borne illness 
+ + 
Probability of a customer contracting a 
food borne illness 
- - 
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As Tables 2 and 3 shows, if a product causes a food borne illness with a higher 
expected incubation time, then the expected time to detection through food borne 
illnesses will also increase. This is because customers will take longer to show 
symptoms of the disease and hence will report the illness later as compared to products 
which cause illnesses with lower expected incubation times. 
For example, fresh produce such as tomatoes and spinach cause salmonella 
related illnesses, which have a relatively shorter incubation time as compared to the 
incubation time for Campylobacter jejuni caused by pork products (Strohbehn and 
Beattie 1995). 
Table 2: Impact of product attributes on sampling benefit, origin at supplier 
Sampling at → 
Product attributes 
         ↓ 
Supplier Processing center Retailer 
Expected Incubation time  ◆ ◆ ◆ 
Shelf life ◆ ◆ ◆ 
Retailer service level ◇ ◇ Varies 
Similarly, an increase in shelf life of a product means that a customer may 
consume a product much later as compared to a product with shorter shelf life, as we 
assume that a customer consumes a product between the time he/she purchases it and 
discards it on the expiry of its shelf life. This in turn implies that if a food borne illness is 
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caused by product with a longer shelf life it will be reported later as compared to one 
with shorter shelf life. Therefore, ceteris paribus, products with a shorter shelf life, such 
as fresh produce, tend to have lower expected time to detection through food borne 
illnesses as compared to products with a longer shelf life such as milk powder, tea and 
cereal. 
Further, in the case of contamination origin at the supplier and sampling at the 
supplier or processing center, products with lower service levels at the retailer reach the 
customer in expectation at a later time, because there is the chance of a stock out. 
Therefore, in case of a contamination event, customer reports of illness will also tend to 
take a longer time, as compared to products with higher service levels, which are 
purchased faster. 
Table 3: Impact of product attributes on sampling benefit, origin at processing center 
Sampling at → 
Product attributes 
         ↓ 
Supplier Retailer 
Expected Incubation time  ◆ ◆ 
Shelf life ◆ ◆ 
Retailer service level ◇ Varies 
Expected customer demand rate ◇ Varies 
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For the case of contamination origin at the processing center and sampling at the 
processing center, products with a lower expected demand rate will be bought less 
quickly by customers. Hence, any reports of food borne illness will tend to take longer, 
compared to products with higher demand rates. 
As particular examples of food product types that may exhibit these product 
characteristics, one can contrast meat products (such as hams, processed meats, and 
roasts), with fresh vegetable products such as tomatoes.  
Using the results from Tables 2 and 3, it can be concluded that meat products 
such as hams and roasts, which have higher values of incubation time, shelf life and 
typically lower values of retailer service levels, receive greater benefit from sampling. 
Comparatively, products such as tomatoes which have relatively higher values of 
service levels, and lower shelf lives and incubation times, receive lower benefit from 
sampling. Processed pork products, for example, typically have a lower service level of 
approximately 87%-90%  (Matsa 2009), a shelf life of a few months (Food Storage and 
Shelf life Recipetips.com) and can cause food borne illnesses due to the bacteria 
Campylobacter jejuni which has an average incubation time of 4  days (Strohbehn and 
Beattie 1995). Products such as tomatoes comparatively have a higher service level of 
about 96%, shelf life of 2.5 weeks and can cause the food borne illness Salmonellosis 
which has an average incubation time of 18 hours (Strohbehn and Beattie 1995). 
Thus, these product attributes determine that for these meat products a given 
sampling strategy tends to be more beneficial than waiting for customer reports of food 
borne illness. If one wants a sampling strategy for products such as tomatoes to be as 
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successful as a given sampling strategy for hams and roasts, one needs to sample more 
frequently. Adoption of a strategy of more frequent sampling will, however, lead to a 
higher sampling cost. Conversely, one can sample less frequently in the case of products 
such as ham and roasts. 
 
2.13. Summary 
This chapter presents a detailed description of the multi-stage food supply chain 
model and its behavior in the event of a product contamination. The raw material (fruits, 
vegetables etc.) arrive in batches from the supplier to the processing center from the 
where they are processed into the final product and added to the finished goods 
inventory. The final product is then sold at the retailers and reaches the customer. In the 
event of a product contamination occurring along the supply chain, the customer 
contracts a food borne illness. A G/G/1 queuing process at the processing center and an 
order up to inventory policy at the retailers is modeled and the safety stock at the 
processing center is evaluated.  
The performance metrics of the model; the amount of contaminated stock (sold 
and unsold) and time to detection of the contamination event are established. The impact 
of the origin and mode of discovery contamination (sampling or a food borne illness) on 
the performance metrics is analyzed. The cost of food product contamination in terms of 
the performance metrics of the model is evaluated. The minimum annual budget required 
for a company to implement a quality control process which can eradicate contamination 
prior to the outbreak of a food borne illness is determined. 
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In this chapter the impact of product attributes, supply chain structure and 
properties on the performance metrics in the event of a contamination is also studied. 
Supply chains with varying number of retailers and different product groups (tomatoes 
vs. pork products) are compared and contrasted. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted 
to analyze the effect of input parameters of the model on the time to detection and the 
amount of contaminated stock. 
In the next chapter, a numerical case study is conducted based on the 
mathematical model presented in this research.  Two real world incidents of food 
product contamination in the tomato and lettuce supply chains leading to food borne 
illnesses are considered. 
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CHAPTER III 
NUMERICAL CASE STUDY 
 
3.1. Real World Food Product Contamination 
In this section two recent high-profile cases of food product contamination and 
recalls are examined and related numerical results are derived based on the mathematical 
model presented in Chapter II.  
1. Tomato recall, June 2008: From mid April 2008 there were a total of 
1251 persons infected with Salmonella Saintpaul identified in 43 states, the District of 
Columbia across the U.S.and Canada. At least 229 of these persons had been 
hospitalized and there were two outbreak-associated deaths. States reporting illnesses 
linked to the outbreak included Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin (FDA Recalls and Alerts, 2008). Investigations revealed 
that jalapeno peppers were a major source of contamination and serrano peppers were 
also a source. Additionally tomatoes were also believed to be a source particularly early 
in the outbreak.  
Jalapeno peppers were traced back to distributors in the United States that 
received produce grown and packed in Mexico. The outbreak strain was isolated from 
samples of jalapeno peppers collected in a US warehouse and a patient's home and from 
samples of Serrano peppers and water collected on a farm in Mexico (CDC 2008).  
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The FDA recommended that retailers, restaurateurs, and food service operators 
not offer for sale and service some varieties of tomatoes and also asked consumers to 
avoid eating fresh jalapeno peppers and food products made with jalapeno peppers 
during the investigation process (FDA Recalls and Alerts 2008).  
The recall process had far-reaching economic impact. The U.S. tomato industry 
took a $100 million hit as restaurants temporarily dropped tomatoes from their menus, 
and farmers had to leave crops to rot in packing houses (Associated Press 2008). 
McDonald's, Wal-Mart, Burger King, Kroger, Outback Steakhouse, Winn-Dixie and 
Taco Bell were among the companies that withdrew tomatoes. Restaurants including 
Taco Bell, KFC, Red Lobster, Olive Garden and Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc.; stopped 
serving most varieties of tomatoes in 15 states. Grocery stores such as Kroger, Trader 
Joe’s and Publix also pulled out some varieties of tomatoes from their stores in several 
states based on the FDA advisory (Johnson 2008). 
` A study by Flanders (2008) about the economic impact of the outbreak on the 
state of Georgia's tomato production states that decreased demand for Georgia tomatoes 
due to the tomato consumption warning resulted in diminished markets for all tomatoes. 
It estimates the total production values losses in the state at $13.9 million. The report 
states that the loss of production value had negative impact on the Georgia economy as 
decreased grower income led to reduced economic activity. It concludes that the 
decreased output impact totals $11.8 million, and combined with the decline in tomato 
sales, the total economic output decrease in the Georgia economy is about $25.7 million 
(Flanders  2008). 
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2. Lettuce recall, 2010: An ongoing case of recall started in May 2010 due 
to the contamination of lettuce resulting in an E.coli outbreak. To date, there have been 
19 cases of E. coli infections in Michigan, Ohio, and New York. These illnesses include 
12 individuals who have been hospitalized, and 3 with a potentially life threatening 
complications. Preliminary investigations trace back the contamination to a farm in 
Yuma, Arizona (FDA Recalls and Alerts 2010). 
 
3.2. Data Sources 
Based on the mathematical model, input data is generated for two cases similar to 
the ones cited above. Input data for the numerical study is taken from various public 
sources, including USDA, ERS data, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, FDA etc. It is 
assumed that contamination occurs in a tomato and lettuce supply chain leading to food 
borne illnesses caused by salmonella and E.coli respectively.  
The data for the commercial disappearance of tomatoes and lettuce annually is 
available for the years 1992-2006. For example, for the year of 2006 it is reported as 
5,919,900,000 lbs (USDA/ ERS data 2010) for tomatoes. Commercial disappearance 
data can be used to proxy national demand of a food product (Blisard et al. 1999), 
(Outlaw et al. 1994). The data for the total number of food retailers which sell tomatoes 
and lettuce nationwide such as supermarkets, grocery stores, fruit and vegetable markets 
is also available through census data (US Census Bureau Economic census). The 
commercial disappearance data is averaged over the total number of food retailers and 
statistical data fitting is used to fit it to a normal distribution and obtain the expected 
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customer demand E	D
  and standard deviation of the demand σ	D
 for both tomatoes 
and lettuce in a year at a single, “average” retailer. It is also assumed that the expected 
demand and standard deviation are the same at r retailers in the  since we aim to 
compare the impact of contamination on the supply chain and want to avoid bias towards 
any of the r retailers due to the amount of customer demand at each of them.  
The data on retail stock outs are from the Commodity and Services Survey, 
which is used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to compute the consumer 
price index (CPI). This data is used to estimate the service levels for tomatoes and 
lettuce at the retailer (Matsa 2009). The stock out rate for tomatoes and lettuce is 3.6% 
and 1.8% approximately (Matsa 2009). In the numerical study therefore the retailer 
service level for tomatoes and lettuce is varied from 95% to 99%. 
The shelf life of tomatoes H depending on the variety varies from 1 to 5 weeks 
and the shelf life of lettuce is between 7 to 12 days (Food storage and shelf life, 
Recipetips.com). 
The average range of the incubation period for common food borne illnesses T( 
is available from medical research data and is as listed in Table 4 (Strohbehn and Beattie 
1995).  The incubation time for Salmonellosis and E.coli is varied between theses ranges 
from the data available. 
The lead times L and l  for tomatoes are assumed to be higher than the lead times 
for lettuce, as the tomatoes are imported to the USA from Mexico as compared to lettuce 
which is a locally grown product. It is also assumed that the maximum lead time of 
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either tomatoes or lettuce is less than or equal to either of their shelf lives. The lead 
times are then varied to obtain consistent results. 
Table 4: Incubation time 
Food borne illness Range of incubation time 
Bacillus cereus 0.5-15 hrs 
Campylobacter jejuni 1-7days 
Escherichia (E) coli 2-4 days 
Salmonellosis 12-24 hrs 
Clostridium botulinum 12-36 hrs 
We vary the values of the individual item service times E	S
 for tomato and 
lettuce so as to hold the server utilization factor at the processing center from 50% to 
98%. This is because tomatoes and lettuce are both products commonly purchased 
products with high demand, it can be assumed that the server stays moderately to highly 
busy at the processing center during the time period when this produce is in season. 
The number of customers having to report a food borne illness before a food 
borne illness scare can be recorded, T  is assumed to vary from 1 to maximum of 1300. 
In the case of the 2008 tomato contamination, the total number of customers reporting an 
illness was 1251 (FDA Recalls and Alerts 2008), whereas in the recent case of lettuce 
the total number of cases are approximately equal to 19 to date (FDA Recalls and Alerts 
2010). It can be assumed that the number of food borne illnesses which were reported 
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before a food borne illness scare could be recorded, is less than the total number of cases 
which were finally recorded.  
The probability p of a customer contracting a food borne illness on consuming a 
contaminated food product is such that 0 < ë ≤ 1 . The case of p = 0  is not considered 
as it would imply that the contamination cannot be discovered through a food borne 
illness. 
The data from retailer specifications for baby lettuce and heirloom tomatoes at a 
particular grower/ processing center (Earthbound Farm Organic) is used to evaluate the 
batch size k (Earthbound farm organic food service products 2010). It is assumed that 
each batch consists of case(s). The case(s) in turn consists of the raw material which is 
processed into the final product. Lettuce is shipped in batches consisting of 45 cases. 
Tomatoes are shipped in batches consisting of 88 cases each (Earthbound Farm Organic 
Food service Products 2010). 
The retailer specifications at Earthbound farm organic are used to evaluate the 
number of final products each item of raw material is processed into m. The batches 
arriving from the supplier consist of cases of raw material. Each case of lettuce is 
processed into 1 bag of lettuce weighing 3 lbs. Therefore, m = 1  for lettuce. Similarly, 
each case of tomatoes is processed into a bag of tomatoes weighing 10 lbs. Hence, 
m = 1  for tomatoes (Earthbound farm organic food service products 2010). 
The standard deviation of the batch inter arrival time σ	A!
 and the service time σ	S
 are varied extensively. In all cases the variation is found to have no impact on our 
results. 
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The sampling strategy is a policy decision that is defined by the frequency with 
which a sample is taken. This frequency is described by the parameter N which is 
defined as the number of batches between successive samples. Thus, a high value of N 
corresponds to infrequent sampling and a low value corresponds to frequent sampling. 
To further analyze the impact of the sampling strategy N  on the results we set the values 
of p, σ	A!
 and the service time σ	S
 to fixed, reasonable values as cited in Table 5 and 
described above. The time to detection and the amount of contaminated stock are varied 
as functions of N  by setting N = 1, ⋯ ,500. Based on the results it can be concluded that 
the results are consistent for a wide range of values of N  and follow similar trends.  
Also a sensitivity analysis of, σ	A!
 and σ	S
  is performed and there are no 
significant changes in the trends.  
The number of retailers r in the multiple retailer supply chain is varied from 1-
100 and the corresponding results are analyzed. 
Numerical results from the model are generated for the range of input parameter 
values described above. The results are found to be consistent and follow the same 
trends over the range of the input values. Table 5 gives the values of a specific set of 
input parameters used for tomato and lettuce, which is one among the given range of 
input parameter values.  
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Table 5: Input parameters for numerical study 
Input Parameters Tomato Lettuce 
Processing center service level β$ 0.9 0.95 
Retailer service level β 0.95 0.95 
Customer demand rate (lbs/day) D 45.83 57.01 
Standard deviation of demand rate (lbs/day) σ	D
 6.12 7.82 
Batch size k 88 45 
Standard deviation of batch inter arrival time σ	A!
 0.03 0.033 
Item service time (days) S 0.0215 0.01752 
Standard deviation of item service time (days) σ	S
 0.0015 0.0000365 
Supplier to processing center lead time (days) L 2.55 0.405 
Processing center to retailer lead time (days) l 1.46 0.365 
Sampling strategy (number of batches) N 1, ⋯ ,500 1, ⋯ ,500 
Shelf life (days) H 8 7.3 
Number of people showing symptoms T 100 100 
Incubation time (days) T( 0.75 2.99 
Probability of contracting illness p 0.65 0.65 
Number of final products each item of raw material is processed 
into m 
1 1 
Number of retailers r 1, ⋯ ,100 1, ⋯ ,100 
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3.3. Validation of Data Impact 
The impact that each input parameter has on the output of the model is also 
studied by varying each individual input parameter numerically. For input parameters 
such E	D
, L, l, T(, k, m, σ	D
, β which take on a fixed value as stated in the data 
description above and Table 5, the input parameters are varied by ±50% of the fixed 
base parameter value . For input parameters such asE	S
, H, σ	S
, σ	A!
, T, p, N, r which 
follow a range of values we again vary the parameters by ±50%  of their minimum and 
maximum values wherever viable. The corresponding change in the outputs the time to 
detection and the amount of contaminated stock is then noted. The impact of the input 
parameters on the output is classified as high or low in Table 6 depending on the relative 
change it causes to the output parameters. 
It can be seen from Table 6 that numerically a variation in the input parameters 
of customer demand rate, retailer service level and the number of final products each 
item of raw material is processed into have the highest impact on the outputs of the 
model. It can be noted that in our model the customer demand rate, service level and 
number of final products each item of raw material is processed into have been obtained 
from real time data.  
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Table 6: Impact of input parameters on the performance metrics 
Input parameters Impact on performance 
metrics 
Retailer service level High 
Customer demand rate (lbs/yr) High 
Standard deviation of demand rate Low 
Batch size Low 
Standard deviation of batch inter arrival time Low 
Item service time (yrs) Low 
Standard deviation of item service time (yrs) Low 
Supplier to processing center lead time (yrs) Low 
Processing center to retailer lead time (yrs) Low 
Sampling strategy (number of batches) Low 
Shelf life (yrs) Low 
Number of people showing symptoms Low 
Incubation time (yrs) Low 
Probability of contracting illness Low 
Number of final products each item of raw material is 
processed into 
High 
Number of retailers Low 
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3.4. Discussion of Numerical Results 
For the case when contamination occurs at the supplier or the processing for both 
tomatoes and lettuce we observe the following from the numerical results as depicted by 
the graphs in Figures (5-12). The number of retailers is r = 10. 
 
Figure 5: Tomato: Time to detection (Origin Supplier) 
 
Figure 6: Tomato: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Supplier) 
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Figure 7: Tomato: Time to detection (Origin Processing Center) 
 
Figure 8: Tomato: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Processing Center) 
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of contaminated stock for sampling at the processing center and sampling at the retailer 
is to the order of one magnitude. This implies that the location of sampling has a very 
high impact on the performance metrics and, in turn, the severity of the contamination 
event. 
 
Figure 9: Lettuce: Time to detection (Origin Supplier) 
It can also be seen that for both tomatoes and lettuce sampling at the processing 
center detects contamination close to the time of detection through a food borne illness. 
This implies that in most cases it may be barely worth it to sample at the processing 
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It is also observed that sampling at the retailer can only detect the contamination 
prior to a food borne illness event, if sampling is done at least every N = 2  batches (or 
every 1760  lbs) for tomato. Similarly, sampling at the retailer can only detect the 
contamination prior to a food borne illness event, if sampling is done at least every 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50
T
im
e
 
to
 
de
te
c
tio
n
 
(d
a
ys
)
Sampling strategy
Sampling at supplier
Sampling at 
processing center
Sampling at retailer
Food borne illness
92 
 
 
Figure 10: Lettuce: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Supplier) 
 
Figure 11: Lettuce: Time to detection (Origin Processing Center) 
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Figures 5-12 where the time to detection and the amount of contaminated stock are 
plotted as functions of the sampling strategy N  for the case of origin at the supplier and 
processing center for both tomato and lettuce. 
 
Figure 12: Lettuce: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Processing Center) 
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batches (or 8100  lbs of lettuce)  for both origin at supplier and the processing center 
Therefore if a company cannot sample at a frequency N < 60 then it should not invest in 
any other sampling strategy.  
This result is particularly significant as in the U.S. the legal rule in the event of 
food contamination is “strict liability” where the seller of the product to the costumer 
involved in more stages of handling the food is held responsible. The seller cannot claim 
lack of prior knowledge of the contamination or that the incident was not foreseeable 
(Sumner, Pouliot 2008). Specifically, in the model in this research the processing center 
will be responsible even in the case where origin of contamination is at the supplier. 
Therefore the above result where by using a particular sampling strategy the processing 
center can preempt detection through a food borne illness becomes even more crucial. 
On the other hand, when sampling at the supplier, it is possible to obtain positive 
benefits from a less-frequent sampling strategy: in our example, a sampling strategy of 
N < 32  (or every 28160 lbs) results in detection of contamination prior to a food borne 
illness event for tomato and a sampling strategy of N < 73  (or every 9855 lbs) results 
in detection of contamination prior to a food borne illness event for lettuce. This 
observation again underlines the importance of the choice of location for establishing a 
useful sampling strategy. 
The Figures 13-20 depict the variation in the expected time to detection and the 
expected amount of contaminated stock decrease as the number of retailers varies for 
various modes of detection for origin at the supplier and processing center for tomato 
and lettuce. It can be seen that for detection through sampling at the supplier the 
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performance metrics remain the same, while for all modes of detection the performance 
metrics increase as the number of retailers increase for both tomato and lettuce. The 
sampling strategy is N = 5 for tomatoes and N = 20 for lettuce. 
 
Figure 13: Tomato: Time to detection (Origin Supplier) N=5 
 
Figure 14: Tomato: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Supplier) N=5 
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Figure 15: Tomato: Time to detection (Origin Processing Center) N=5 
 
Figure 16: Tomato: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Processing Center) N=5 
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Figure 17: Lettuce: Time to detection (Origin Supplier) N=20 
 
Figure 18: Lettuce: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Supplier) N=20 
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Figure 19: Lettuce: Time to detection (Origin Processing Center) N=20 
 
Figure 20: Lettuce: Amount of contaminated stock (Origin Processing Center) N=20 
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occur in a tomato and lettuce supply chain and lead to food borne illnesses and product 
recall are considered. 
The evaluation of the data from diverse public sources is described and the 
impact of data on the performance metrics is assessed. The performance metrics are 
evaluated for supply chains with increasing number of retailers and implementing 
various sampling strategies for both tomato and lettuce. 
In the next the concept of product traceability in the supply chain is introduced 
and discussed in context of the model presented in this research. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TRACEABILITY OF FOOD PRODUCTS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
4.1. Traceability Systems 
A traceability system enables the tracking and trace back of food products in the 
supply chain in the event of a product contamination and recall. In order to initiate an 
effective recall, a traceability system must be able to accurately trace backward and 
forward in the supply chain in order to find all products affected by the contamination 
(Jansen-Vullers et al. 2003). Thus, a traceability system may allow for faster and more 
precise recall of contaminated food products from the supply chain possibly mitigating 
costs for companies and health risks for consumers.  
Traceability systems can comprise of technology such as RFID (Radio 
Frequency Identification) electronic product tags. RFID is a contactless interrogation 
method for identification of objects (Gaukler and Seifert 2007). An RFID system 
essentially consists of three parts: the RFID tag itself, the RFID reader device, and a 
backend IT system (Gaukler and Seifert 2007).   RFID technology can be utilized to 
track and trace the food product’s origin and when combined with sensor technology can 
allow for the monitoring of a product’s location within the supply chain (Fritz and 
Schiefer 2009).  For example, RFID tags maybe attached to individual batches or boxes 
of cereal. RFID tagging can in turn be combined with information systems networks, 
internet communication and software agents to fully realize the range of tracking and 
tracing functionalities (Fritz and Schiefer 2009).  
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There are papers available in literature which discuss in detail the technology 
utilized in the implementation of RFID based traceability systems in food supply chains 
(Abad et al. 2007), (Ngai et al. 2008) (Hannus et al. 2003), (Mousavi et al. 2005), 
(Thompson et al. 2005) and (Jedermann et al. 2006). The exact traceability system 
implemented in a particular food supply chain will depend on the product type and also 
on the electronic agreements in place between enterprises (Fritz and Schiefer 2009). 
In this research however, we are interested in evaluating the value of 
implementing any such RFID based traceability system in the supply chain. Quantifying 
the value of traceability in a given supply chain scenario may help companies in 
evaluating the necessity and economic benefits of implementing traceability systems. 
To this end, we simulate a supply chain model equipped with traceability 
capabilities in ARENA.  We then formulate a performance metric to help assess the 
impact of the supply chain structure, properties and the levels of traceability 
implemented on the value of traceability.  
 
4.2. Validation of the Simulation Model 
At first we simulate the supply chain model presented in this research in ARENA 
and validate it by comparing the simulation results with the numerical case study results 
in Chapter III. 
As described in Section 2.1, consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier, 
processing center and retailer(s). The supplier ships raw material in batches to the 
processing centers at time, the batches are broken down at the processing centers on 
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arrival and wait in a queue for processing. On completion of processing the finished 
products are added to the finished goods inventory at the processing center. The 
retailer(s) places orders every period on checking the customer demand. The processing 
center ships finished products to the retailer(s) every period. The customer demand 
follows a normal distribution with known mean and standard deviation.  
It is assumed that an ongoing contamination originates at the supplier at time t =
0 and the mode of detection of the contamination is through the outbreak of a food borne 
illness.  As discussed in Section 2.7.4. food recall investigations are initiated when a 
certain number of food borne illness incidents T,  T ≥1,  are reported and linked to a 
certain food product.  
The supplier start shipping contaminated batches at the start of the simulation 
and the entire subsequent operation of this supply chain model is simulated in ARENA 
(see Appendix) for both the tomato and lettuce case studies described in Chapter III. The 
input data of the model is similar to that utilized in the numerical study and given in 
Table 5, Chapter III. The model is terminated when the specified T food borne illnesses 
are reported.  The simulation length will correspond to the time to detection of the 
contamination. The total amount of contaminated stock (rounded off to the nearest 
decimal) at the time of detection which is in the form of raw material and finished 
products in the supply chain is one of the outputs of the model.  
The outputs from simulation for 50 replications are now compared to the results 
of the numerical case study in Chapter III in order to validate the simulation model in 
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ARENA. The results from the numerical study and the simulation for 
T = 100, 500 and 1000 , for a single retailer r = 1. are presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
It can be seen that time to detection of the contamination and the amount of 
contaminated stock from the numerical study and the simulation coincide reasonably 
well for different values of T. Therefore we can consider the simulation of the supply 
chain model to be valid. 
Table 7: Comparison of numerical study and simulation results (Tomato) 
Tomato Numerical study Simulation 
Number of food 
borne illness 
outbreaks (T) 
Time to 
detection 
(days) 
Amount of 
contaminated 
stock (lbs) 
Time to 
detection 
(days) 
Amount of 
contaminated 
stock (lbs) 
100 12.92 593 13.3 621 
500 33.1 1531 34.82 1592 
1000 59 2705 61.37 2769 
 
4.3. Supply Chain Model with Traceability 
The supply chain described above is now extended so as to consist of four 
suppliers S, SG, S, SÉ , two processing centers P, PG and a cluster of retailer(s) R as 
depicted in Figure 21. It is assumed that all suppliers supply to both the processing 
centers and both the processing centers supply to all the retailer(s). This assumption is 
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made so as to avoid bias towards any node in the supply chain due to its mode of 
operation.  
Table 8: Comparison of numerical study and simulation results (Lettuce) 
Lettuce Numerical study Simulation 
Number of food 
borne illness 
outbreaks (T) 
Time to 
detection 
(days) 
Amount of 
contaminated 
stock (lbs) 
Time to 
detection 
(days) 
Amount of 
contaminated 
stock (lbs) 
100 15.65 893 15.94 945 
500 32.11 1831 30.17 1685 
1000 44.4 2534 38.2 2235 
 
It is presumed that the supply chain is equipped with a traceability system 
capable of imparting information about product origin and location in real time. This 
traceability information is captured in the simulation by recording as outputs the origin 
and location of stock at each stage of the supply chain such as the raw material in transit 
to the processing center from the supplier, batches in queue at the processing center, 
finished products at the FGI etc. 
It is also assumed that an ongoing contamination occurs at one of the suppliers 
leading to a food borne illness outbreak and recall since we aim to evaluate the value of 
a traceability system in such a scenario. This scenario will not be possible if there is a 
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quality control process which eliminates the contamination at the supplier or processing 
center, as discussed in Section 2.8. We however ignore the implementation of such a 
quality control process for the time being as this will lead to the contaminated products 
dispersing further downstream along the supply chain and reaching the customer 
resulting in a food borne illness outbreak. This will give us a bigger picture of the value 
of traceability in the supply chain. 
 
Figure 21: Base case supply chain model (Simulation) 
Henceforth, this model will be referred to as the “base case” and further 
modifications will be made to the base case to create different scenarios for comparison. 
By varying the supply chain structure, properties and also the information generating 
capabilities of the traceability system we aim to assess whether some scenarios benefit 
more from a traceability system as compared to others. 
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4.4. Model Evaluation 
A study conducted among meat and poultry companies implementing a 
traceability system states that the value of traceability for the participants depends on the 
amount of contaminated stock and the subsequent contamination costs (Buhr 2003).The 
cost of contamination in turn is a function of the total amount of contaminated stock as 
discussed in Section 2.9. Therefore the performance metric of the simulation model is 
the amount of contaminated stock distributed at various stages of the supply chain in the 
form of raw material and finished products. It is assumed that this performance metric in 
turn estimates the value of traceability.  
The supply chain simulated in ARENA corresponds to the tomato case study 
described in Chapter III. A Salmonella contamination occurs at a tomato farm leading to 
a food borne illness outbreak and recall. Analogous to this in the simulation model it is 
assumed that a salmonella contamination occurs at the supplier  S leading to a food 
borne illness outbreak.  Table 9 gives the input parameters of the simulation base model, 
these parameters have been evaluated as in the numerical study case in Chapter III. 
Initially for the base case, it is assumed that both processing centers fulfill in 
equal parts of the demand at the retailer(s), i.e. 50% of the total demand at the retailers. 
The four suppliers also fulfill in equal parts the demand to the processing centers, i.e. 
25% of the total demand fulfilled by the processing centers. All other attributes of the 
suppliers, processing centers and retailer(s) such as the lead time from the supplier to the 
processing center, batch size etc. are also assumed to be same. These assumptions are 
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made so as to build an equitable base model against which other models with varying 
attributes can be compared. 
Table 9: Input parameters for the simulation model 
Input Parameters Tomato 
Batch size 10 
Total customer demand (lbs/day) 200 
Standard deviation of demand (lbs/day) 5 
Items processed into 1 
Incubation time (days) 0.74 
Shelf life (days) 7 
Lead time: Suppliers to Processing centers (days) 2 
Lead time: Processing centers to Retailer(s) (days) 1 
Service time (days) 0.007 
Standard deviation of service time (days) 0.0005 
Number of customers contracting illness 200 
Probability of contracting illness 0.65 
Demand fulfilled by P,PG (lbs/day) 100 
Demand fulfilled by  S, SG, S, SÉ (lbs/day) 25 
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At the start of the simulation the suppliers start shipping batches of the raw 
material to the processing centers; this includes the contaminated raw material shipped 
from supplier  S to the processing centers P,PG.The amount and location of the 
contaminated stock originating from the supplier S at each stage of the supply chain is 
the output of the simulation, for example the amount of raw material shipped from 
supplier  S to the processing centers P,PG , the number of finished products processed 
by  P,PG etc. It should be noted that the total contaminated stock can be either be in the 
form of raw material or finished products in the supply chain. 
The simulation is terminated when the number of customers contracting a food 
borne illness, T = 200 . At the termination, the length of the simulation will estimate the 
time to detection of the contamination through a food borne illness outbreak. Table 10 
gives the outputs of the simulation for the base case for 50 replications. In Table 11 we 
list the sample mean, half-width of a 95% confidence interval, and both the minimum 
and maximum of the summary output values across the replications. These measures 
demonstrate that the outputs show minor variation and are meaningful for further 
comparisons to be made.  
Various scenarios are now simulated similarly and compared to the base case so 
as to analyze the value of traceability. In this work, we are mainly concerned with the 
impact of supply chain structure, properties and the level of traceability on the 
performance metrics and in turn the value of traceability. A snapshot of the simulation 
model in ARENA is shown in Figure 22. The complete ARENA model is presented in 
the Appendix.  
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4.5. Supply Chain Properties and Structure 
The supply chain properties that are primarily of interest are the demand fulfilled 
by  S and the lead time from S as they determine the size and location of the 
contamination origin. The effect of a change in the supply chain structure on the value of 
traceability is also analyzed by changing the number of processing centers in the supply 
chain. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: ARENA simulation from supplier to processing center 
4.5.1. Demand 
Initially, the demand fulfilled by S centers is varied to study the impact of low 
and high values of demand on traceability. This can help in assessing the effect of the 
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size of S  on traceability. For example, the demand fulfilled by smaller tomato farms 
will be lower than that fulfilled by larger sized ones.  
It was assumed that the supplier S fulfills 25% of the total demand at the 
processing centers in the base case. Now, the demand fulfilled by S to the processing 
centers is first decreased to 13%  of the total demand for the low demand case and then 
increased to 52%  of the total demand at the processing centers for the high demand 
case. As in the base case the simulation is terminated when 200 food borne illnesses 
occur and the length of the simulation will correspond to the time to detection of the 
contamination. The outputs of the simulation for 50 replications are summarized in 
Tables 12 and 13.  The total demand at the retailer(s), processing centers, lead time and 
the other parameters of the model are the same as in the base case.  
The bar chart in Figure 23 depicts the breakdown of contaminated stock at 
different stages of the supply chain for the low demand, high demand as well as the base 
case. For example from Table 10, for the base case the breakdown of the contaminated 
stock (raw material + finished products) at various stages of the supply chain will be as 
follows:  
1. Raw material in transit from  S to P or in queue at P, 57 lbs. 
2. Raw material in transit from S toPG or in queue at PG, 58 lbs. 
3. Finished products originating from  P to be recalled, 393 lbs. 
4. Finished products originating from  PG, 392 lbs. 
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Table 10: Base case: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of contaminated stock from S Amount of contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 17.66 days 
Total raw material shipped to P and PGeach  450 lbs 
Raw material in transit to P and PGeach 50 lbs 
Total raw material at P and PGeach 400  lbs 
Raw material in queue at P and PGeach 7  lbs, 8 lbs 
Finished products from P and PGeach 393  lbs, 392 lbs 
 
Table 11: Statistical measures of the outputs for the base case 
Outputs Sample Mean 95% 
Confidence 
Interval Half 
Width 
Minimum 
Output  
Maximum 
Output 
Raw material in 
transit to  P 
50 lbs 0.6432 48 54 
Raw material in 
queue at  P 
7 lbs 0.0245 4 10 
Finished 
products from 
 P 
393 lbs 2.5278 390 400 
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Therefore the total contaminated stock originating from S processed by  P   is 
450 lbs of which 57 lbs is in the form of raw material, 393 lbs is in the form of finished 
products. Similarly, the total contaminated stock originating from S processed by  PG  is 
450 lbs of which 58 lbs is in the form of raw material, 392 lbs is in the form of finished 
products. 
It can be seen that that a change in demand has a direct proportional impact on 
the total amount of contaminated stock. For example, in the high demand case when the 
demand fulfilled by S increases by close to two times as compared to the base case (25 
lbs to 52 lbs), the total contaminated stock too increases by nearly twice the amount (900 
lbs to 1640 lbs).  When the demand decreases by close to half (25 lbs to 13 lbs), the total 
contaminated stock also decreases almost proportionately (900 lbs 560 lbs). This is 
because as the supplier fulfills higher or lower demand its production of contaminated 
stock also increases or decreases respectively. 
Further, as we analyze the proportion of raw material and finished products in the 
total contaminated stock for all cases. In the base case the raw material forms 
approximately 13% of the total contaminated stock and the finished products 
(originating at P or PG)  form the remaining 87% of the stock. In the case of high 
demand the proportions remain approximately the same.  
However, in the low demand case the raw material forms just 8% of the total 
contaminated stock whereas the finished products form 92% of the stock. This is 
because the other model parameters such as processing times, lead times etc. are held the 
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same but since the demand and subsequent production is low, a greater percentage of the 
raw material will be processed into finished products. 
It was noted that though for the present high demand case the proportions of raw 
material and finished products are same as in the base case, for a further higher demand 
the proportion of raw material in the contaminated stock increases and the amount of 
finished products decreases. 
Table 12: Low demand: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of contaminated stock from S 
  
Amount of contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 21.338 days 
Total raw material shipped to P and PGeach 280 lbs 
Raw material in transit to P and PGeach 20 lbs 
Total raw material at  P and PGeach 260 lbs 
Raw material in queue at P and PG each 0 lbs 
Finished products from P and PG each 260  lbs 
4.5.2 Lead Time 
Now the lead time from S to the processing centers is varied to study the impact 
of changing lead time on traceability. This can help in assessing the effect of the location 
of S  on traceability. For example, tomato farms located in Mexico supplying to a 
processing center in the U.S. will have a longer lead time as compared to farms in Texas. 
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Table 13: High demand: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of contaminated stock from S Amount of contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 15.76 days 
Total raw material shipped to Pand PG each 820 
Raw material in transit to P and PG each 100 lbs 
Total raw material at Pand PGeach 720  lbs 
Raw material in queue at Pand PGeach 0 lbs 
Finished products from 2 and 2G each 720  lbs 
 
Figure 23: Distribution of contaminated stock (Changing demand) 
The lead time from the supplier to the processing centers is lowered to 1 day and 
then increased to 4 days as compared to the base case. That is, the lead time is decreased 
to half of the lead time in the base case and then increased to twice that in the base case.  
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The total demand fulfilled by all the nodes in the supply chain and the other input 
parameters are the same as in the base case.  The corresponding results of the simulation 
are recorded in Tables 14 and 15. The bar chart depicting the amount of contaminated 
stock at different stages of the supply chain for low and high lead times as well as the 
base case is shown in Figure 24. 
Table 14: Low lead time: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of contaminated stock from S Amount of contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 16.922 days 
Total  raw material shipped to P and PGeach 430 lbs 
Raw material in transit to P and PGeach 20 lbs 
Total raw material at P and PGeach 410 lbs 
Raw material in queue at P and PG each 4  lbs, 5 lbs 
Finished products from P and PG each 406  lbs, 405 lbs 
 For example from Table 14, for the case of low lead time the breakdown of the 
contaminated stock (raw material + finished products) at various stages of the supply 
chain  as shown in the bar chart will be as follows:  
1. Raw material in transit from  S to P and in queue at P, 24 lbs. 
2. Raw material in transit from S toPG and in queue at PG, 25 lbs. 
3. Finished products originating from P, 406 lbs. 
4. Finished products originating from  PG, 405 lbs. 
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It can be seen from Table 14 that for the case of low lead time the total 
contaminated stock originating from S processed by  P  is 430 lbs of which 24 lbs is in 
the form of raw material and 406 lbs as finished products. Similarly, the total 
contaminated stock originating from S processed by  PG  is 430 lbs of which 25 lbs is in 
the form of raw material and 405 lbs as finished products. 
The breakdown of the contaminated stock at different stages of the supply chain 
as shown in the bar chart in Figure 24 for high lead time can also be computed and 
accounted for as above. 
It can be seen that as the lead time from  S  to the processing centers increases (2 
days to 4 days) or decreases (2 days to 1day) as compared to the base case the total 
contaminated stock produced also increases (900 lbs to 960 lbs) or decreases (900 lbs to 
860 lbs) respectively.   
This is because as the lead time from the origin of contamination, S   to the 
processing centers increases the time taken for the contaminated products to reach the 
customer and a food borne illness outbreak to be reported also increases. 
Hence the time to detection increases as can be seen from Tables 10, 14 and 15; 
however, as the demand rate fulfilled by the supplier during this period remains the same 
as in the base case, greater amount of contaminated stock will be produced when the 
lead time is longer. Conversely, lesser amount of contaminated stock will be produced 
for a decrease in lead time. It can also be noted that the increase and decrease in 
contaminated stock for changing lead times is not as significant as that for changing 
demand. 
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Table 15: High lead time: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of contaminated stock from S Amount of contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 19.17 days 
Total raw material shipped to Pand PG each 480 lbs 
Raw material in transit to P and PG each 100 lbs 
Total raw material at Pand PGeach 380  lbs 
Raw material in queue at Pand PGeach 0 lbs 
Finished products from P and PG each 380  lbs 
 
Further as we analyze the proportion of raw material and finished products in the 
total contaminated stock in the low lead time case the raw material forms just 6% of the 
total contaminated stock whereas the finished products form 94% of the stock. This is 
because as lead time decreases lesser amount of raw material will be in transit to the 
processing center as compared to the high lead time case and a greater amount will be 
processed into finished products. For the case of high lead time the raw material will 
form 21% of the total contaminated stock while the finished products form 79% of the 
stock. 
Therefore it can be seen that though the total amount of contaminated stocks are 
not significantly different for changing lead times, the distribution of the stock as raw 
material upstream or finished products downstream differs significantly. Hence, for case 
of smaller lead times from the supplier to the processing center a traceability system 
downstream is more important in order to track the contaminated stock present in the 
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form of finished products at the processing center FGI, in transit to the retailer, on the 
retailer shelf or with the customer. Whereas for longer lead times from the supplier to  
 
Figure 24: Distribution of contaminated stock (Changing lead time) 
the processing center a traceability system upstream to track the raw material at the 
supplier, in transit to the processing center or in queue at the processing center is 
important.  
 
4.5.3. Number of Processing Centers 
Now the impact of a change in the supply chain structure on the value of 
traceability is analyzed. Initially, the number of processing centers is decreased to 1 
processing center P which fulfills the total demand at the retailer(s).Then the number of 
processing centers is increased to 4 by incorporating two additional processing centers 
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P and PÉ to the supply chain. The processing centers P and PÉ are modeled similar to 
the processing centers Pand PG , with each processing center fulfilling a demand of 50 
lbs/day. All the other parameters are as in the base case.  
The results of the simulation are summarized in Tables 16 and 17. The bar chart 
in Figure 25 depicts the amount of contaminated stock at different stages of the supply 
chain for low and high number of processing centers as well as the base case.  
For example from Table 17, for the case of high number of processing centers the 
breakdown of the contaminated stock (raw material + finished products) at various 
stages of the supply chain  as shown in the bar chart will be as follows:  
1. Raw material in transit from  S to P,  PG  P, PÉ, 30 lbs. 
2. Finished products originating from P,  PG P  PÉ, 200 lbs. 
Therefore for the case of high number of processing centers the total contaminated stock 
originating from S processed by  P  is 230 lbs of which 30 lbs is in the form of raw 
material and 200 lbs in the form of finished products.  The distribution of the total 
contaminated stock originating from S and processed by  PG ,  P ,  PÉ is also similar. 
The breakdown of the contaminated stock at different stages of the supply chain 
as shown in the bar chart in Figure 25 for low number of processing centers can also be 
evaluated and accounted for as above from Table 16. It can be seen that as the number of 
processing centers increase (2 to 4) or decrease (2 to 1) the amount of contaminated 
stock also increases (900 lbs to 920 lbs) or decreases (900 lbs to 890 lbs) marginally. 
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Table 16: Low number of processing centers: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of contaminated stock from S Amount of contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 17.62 days 
Total raw material shipped to P  890 lbs 
Raw material in transit to P  100 lbs 
Total raw material at P 790  lbs 
Raw material in queue at P  54  lbs 
Finished products from P  736 lbs 
Table 17: High number of processing centers: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of contaminated stock from S Amount of contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 17.76 days 
Total raw material shipped to P, PG,P, PÉ each 230 lbs 
Raw material in transit to P, PG,P , PÉ each 30 lbs 
Total raw material at P, PG,P, PÉeach 200  lbs 
Raw material in queue at P, PG,P, PÉeach 0 lbs 
Finished products from P, PG,P, PÉ each 200  lbs 
However, of greater significance is the fact that the dispersion of the 
contaminated stock in the supply chain varies as the number of processing centers 
change. Since, the contaminated stock will transit through greater or lesser number of 
processing centers as the number of processing centers to which S supplies varies. The 
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dispersion of the product is an important factor in determining the value of traceability 
as it has a high impact on the scale of track and trace operations to be conducted in the 
event of a recall (Buhr 2003). 
Table 18: Dispersion factor 
Scenario Number of forms of the 
contaminated stock (f) 
Number of 
processing centers 
(p) 
Dispersion 
factor (3) 
Base case  2 2 4 
Decreasing 
processing centers  
2 1 2 
Increasing 
processing centers 
2 4 8 
 To estimate the extent of dispersion in our model due to the change in the 
number of processing centers we define a factor of dispersion ρ.  The factor of 
dispersion ρ is defined as: 
ρ = p × f                                                                                                                                     (4.1)      
where p is the number of processing centers in the supply chain where the contaminated 
stock is processed and f is the number of different forms of contaminated stock (raw 
material, finished products) that has to be tracked and traced at the processing centers. 
This is because we need to track and trace contaminated stock at the all the processing 
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centers in the form of raw material as well as finished products, i.e.; the raw material 
arriving from S  to the processing centers and the finished products departing from all 
processing centers. The value of ρ for different scenarios is summarized in Table 18.  
As the value of the dispersion factor increases the stock is more widely 
dispersed.  The dispersion factor represents the location as well as the type of 
contaminated stock in which has to be tracked and traced in the event of a recall. The 
corresponding dispersion of stock in the supply chain can also be seen visually in the bar 
chart in Figure 25.  
 
4.6. Levels of Traceability 
The traceability system in totality is the combination of information on tags on 
the product and a real time sensor or software system which tracks and traces the 
product. The level of traceability refers to how far back and the extent to which the 
traceability system is capable of tracking and tracing products in the supply chain. The 
level of traceability will be partly determined by the information available from the 
product regarding its origin and the nodes it has transited through in the supply chain. 
Therefore partial information will translate into a partial level of traceability and 
complete information can lead to complete traceability.  
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Figure 25: Distribution of contaminated stock (Changing number of processing centers) 
Analytically for our supply chain model, this information can be considered to be 
in the form of an information set 6S, P , R)7 attached to each finished product where the 
elements of the set are defined as: 
S : Supplier(s) from where the raw material in the product originated, i = 1, ⋯ ,4. P: Processing center(s) where the product was processed, j = 1,2. 
R): Retailer where the product is sold, k = 1. 
Therefore if the information set attached to the product is of the form sS, PG, Rv 
it indicates that the raw material in the product originated from supplier S , the product 
was processed at processing centers PG and sold at retailer R. Here, we approximate the 
cluster of retailers as a single retailer where all products are sold as we are interested in 
analyzing the impact of information about the suppliers which includes the node of 
origin of contamination on the value of traceability. 
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The impact of the level of traceability on the amount of contaminated stock is 
now analyzed by considering cases where there is partial and no information to track and 
trace the supply chain in the event of a product contamination and recall.  
 
4.6.1. Complete Supply Chain Information  
 We assume that for the base case complete information is available on each 
product about the supplier, processing center and the retailer that the product has 
transited through.   
This implies that for the base case the information set attached to each 
contaminated product will be of the form sS, P, Rv or sS, PG, Rv indicating that the 
raw material in the product originated from supplier S, the product was processed at 
processing centers P and sold at retailer R or the raw material in the product originated 
from supplier S, the product was processed at processing centers PG and sold at retailer R. This information set provides complete information about the origin and the nodes 
that the contaminated product has transited through in the supply chain. This information 
can then be utilized to trace and track the contaminated stock in the supply chain.  
The following scenarios of partial and no information are now compared to the 
base case. The other input parameters remain the same as in the base case. 
 
4.6.2.  Partial Supplier Information 
It is assumed that the traceability system is capable of imparting information that 
states that the raw material in the product has originated from suppliers S and SG but is 
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not capable of giving further information about which specific supplier or farm the raw 
material in the contaminated product originates from. This can correspond to a scenario 
where there might be information about tomatoes originating from farms in California 
but there is no information about which specific farm in California they belong to.  
The information set attached to the contaminated product will be of the form   
6S, SG, P,, R7 or 6S, SG, PG,, R7 indicating that the raw material in the product 
originated from supplier S and SG  , was processed at processing centers Pand sold at 
retailer R or that the raw material in the product originated from supplier S and SG  , 
was processed at processing centers PGand sold at retailer R .   
Due to the availability of only partial information in this case the search space for 
all recall operations will include potentially contaminated stock from suppliers S as well 
as SG   thus widening the search space. This implies that on detection of the 
contamination as the information set attached to the contaminated product suggests that 
the raw material in the product belongs to S and SG we will be forced to consider stock 
originating from suppliers S as well as SG as contaminated and this total amount is 
referred to as the “potentially contaminated stock”.   
The “potentially contaminated stock” represents an error in evaluating the 
contaminated stock due to the lack of complete information about the suppliers. The 
contaminated stock in this case will actually originate only from supplier S  as in the 
base case and the “actual contaminated stock” is the same as the amount of contaminated 
stock in the base case. It can be assumed that the “potentially contaminated stock” will 
be used as an indicator for initiating initial recall operations. The simulation in this case 
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evaluates the “potentially contaminated stock” by considering stock originating from 
both S and SG as contaminated. 
Table 19: Partial supplier information: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of stock from S and SG Potentially contaminated stock  
Time to detection = 17.69 days 
Total raw material shipped to P and PGeach 900 lbs 
Raw material in transit to P and PGeach 100 lbs 
Total raw material at P and PGeach 800  lbs 
Raw material in queue at P and PG each 13  lbs, 15 lbs 
Finished products from P and PG each 787  lbs, 785 lbs 
The results from the simulation of this scenario are summarized in Table 19. The 
breakdown of the “potentially contaminated stock” (raw material + finished products) at 
various stages of the supply chain as shown in the bar chart in Figure 26 will be as 
follows:  
1. Raw material in transit from  S or SG to P and in queue at P, 113 lbs. 
2. Raw material in transit from S or SG toPG and in queue at PG, 115 lbs. 
3. Finished products originating from P, 787 lbs. 
4. Finished products originating from PG, 785 lbs. 
The total “potential amount of contaminated stock” from S and SG to  P is 900 
lbs, of which 113 lbs is in the form of raw material and 787 lbs is in the form of finished 
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products from P.  Similarly, the total “potential amount of contaminated stock” from S and SG to  PG is 900 lbs, of which 115 lbs is in the form of raw material and 785 lbs is 
in the form of finished products from PG. 
It can be noted that the total “potentially contaminated stock” (1800 lbs) in for 
the partial supplier information case is twice the amount of contaminated stock in the 
base case (900 lbs). This is because stock originating from both  S  and  SG  is 
considered potentially contaminated” instead of the “actual contaminated stock” from 
just S . 
 
4.6.3. No  Supplier Information 
In this case it is assumed that the traceability system is capable of imparting 
information about the processing centers that the product has been processed at and the 
retailer it has been sold at but there is no further information regarding the supplier. Such 
a scenario is possible when suppliers are located overseas and it may be difficult to 
implement traceability systems at those locations, for example: tomatoes grown on farms 
in Mexico. 
Table 20: No supplier information: Distribution of contaminated stock 
Location of products from processing centers P and PG Potentially contaminated stock 
Time to detection = 17.69 days 
Finished products from P and PG each 1572  lbs 
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The information set attached to the contaminated product will be of the form  
6P,, R7 or 6PG,, R7.  Due to the availability of no information about suppliers in this 
case the search space for recall operations will include all products processed at the 
processing centers P and PG irrespective of the supplier they have originated from, thus 
widening the search space further.  
This implies that on detection of the contamination we will be forced to consider 
products containing raw material originating from all the suppliers S , SG,  S and SÉ  as 
contaminated and this total amount is referred to as the “potentially contaminated stock”.  
The “potentially contaminated stock” represents an error in evaluation of the 
contaminated stock due to the lack of complete information.  
The contaminated stock in this case too will actually originate only from 
supplier S  as in the base case and the “actual contaminated stock” is the same as the 
amount of contaminated stock in the base case. The results for this case are given in 
Table 20.  The breakdown of the “potentially contaminated stock” in the form of 
finished products at various stages of the supply chain as shown in the bar chart will be 
as follows:  
1. Finished products originating from P, 1572 lbs. 
2. Finished products originating from PG, 1572 lbs. 
The “potential amount of contaminated products” from  Pand  PG  each is 1572 
lbs.  It can be noted that the total “potentially contaminated products” (3144 lbs) in this 
case is approximately four times the number of finished contaminated products in the 
base case (3140 lbs). It can also be seen that due to the lack of complete information 
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regarding the suppliers, the amount of contaminated raw material cannot be estimated 
and the “potentially contaminated stock” just accounts for the finished products from the 
processing centers. 
The bar chart in Figure 26 depicts the breakdown of the “potentially 
contaminated stock”.  The proportion of the raw material and the finished products to the 
total contaminated stock is the same for the base case and the case of partial supplier 
information.  This is because the operation of the supply chain and other parameters are 
the same in both cases and the only change is due to the “overestimation” of 
contaminated stock due to lack of complete information. 
It can be seen that the “potentially contaminated stock” is greater in the case of 
no information about suppliers as compared to the case of partial information about 
suppliers. This is because as discussed earlier, in the partial information about suppliers 
case the contaminated stock is presumed to originate from both suppliers  S  and SG , 
whereas in the no information case stock from all the suppliers S , SG,  S and SÉ  is 
assumed to be contaminated. 
4.7. Summary 
In this chapter the implementation of traceability systems to track and trace 
products in the event of a food product recall is analyzed. An ARENA based simulation 
model is built which incorporates traceability into the supply chain model presented 
earlier in this dissertation. 
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Figure 26: Distribution of contaminated stock (Changing information) 
Various scenarios are modeled to analyze the value of traceability in the supply 
chain context. Supply chain properties, structure and levels of traceability are varied to 
evaluate the amount of contaminated stock in different forms at various locations in the 
supply chain. The next chapter provides a summary and discusses the conclusions and 
future research. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
5.1. Summary 
In this research the performance of a food supply chain model consisting of a 
supplier, processing center and retailer(s) in the event of a contamination leading to a 
food borne illness has been studied. Multi-stage supply chain models with a single 
retailer and multiple retailers are developed and compared. The impact of product 
contamination on the models is analyzed mathematically. The negative dependence of 
contamination on the origin and mode of detection of the contamination is quantified.  A 
numerical study of the impact of a real-world contamination event in a tomato and 
lettuce supply chain is also conducted. 
It is assumed that contamination can occur at the supplier or processing center. 
The mode of detection of contamination is through sampling at the supplier, processing 
center or the retailer(s). In addition, the contamination may also be discovered through 
the outbreak of a food borne illness.  
In this model, the performance metrics of the model which are the expected 
amount of contaminated stock, expected time to detection of the contamination event 
and the subsequent costs of contamination for the different origins and modes of 
discovery of contamination have been quantified. The differences in individual food 
product attributes which can impact the cost of contamination are analyzed. The impact 
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of supply chain structure and properties and detection policies on the severity of 
potential contamination cases is also studied.  
The cost effective sampling strategies which can be adopted by the players in the 
supply chain are derived.  The payoff from the implementation of a quality control 
process which can eradicate contamination is evaluated.  
Further, a traceability system capable of tracking and tracing back products in the 
event of a food product recall is incorporated in the supply chain model. The value of 
traceability for different supply chain scenarios is assessed through the implementation 
of ARENA based simulation model.  
 
5.2. Conclusion 
The research questions posed in Chapter I are now revisited and the findings of 
this research are discussed in the context of these questions.  
The first research question was to determine the impact of contamination origin 
and discovery mode on the severity of the event. 
The model in this research shows that the shows that regardless of how often one 
chooses to perform sampling the performance metrics are worse when sampling at the 
supplier (processing center) for the case of origin at the supplier (processing center). Our 
model shows that the closer one samples to the origin of contamination, the better the 
performance metrics will be. This implies that a sampling strategy implemented closest 
to the node with the highest probability of contamination is most effective. In fact, this 
reinforces a widely used principle which states that controls for high risk processes in 
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the food sector should be placed at the stage with a high failure probability (Bertolini et 
al. 2007). Hence, the location of sampling is more important than the sampling regimen 
adopted by companies or government agencies. Therefore an understanding of where 
and with what probability contamination originates, is of prime importance to the 
decision maker.  
Ideally, a company will want to sample less frequently to keep sampling costs at 
a minimum. Proposition 2.7.4.2 shows the least frequent sampling strategy that a 
company can adopt to keep sampling costs at a minimum and preempt detection by 
customer reports of food borne illnesses.  
In Proposition 2.7.4.3 it is demonstrated that for global supply chains and under 
realistic sampling strategies at the processing center or the retailer, the impact of 
contamination is most significant when the origin is at the supplier. These conditions are 
seen to hold for tomatoes in the numerical study. 
In addition, the numerical study for tomato and lettuces also validate these 
analytical results. The numerical study shows that the choice of where to sample has a 
very significant impact on the overall cost of contamination. For example, in the case 
where the contamination origin is at the supplier, sampling at the processing center leads 
to an approximately ten times higher amount of contaminated stock, compared to 
sampling at the supplier.  
It is also observed in the numerical study for all cases that sampling at the retailer 
detects contamination much later than detection through a food borne illness except 
when using an extremely stringent sampling strategy. This implies that sampling at the 
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retailer is redundant in a number of cases as detection through a food borne illness 
occurs much before a successful sampling event. Sampling at the processing center 
detects contamination only quicker than food borne illness reports when using a 
moderate sampling strategy.  
Even though sampling at the supplier is the best option to detect contamination 
and minimize losses, in cases where the supplier/grower is located overseas (as in the 
tomato case study) it may be difficult to implement and monitor safety procedures. In 
such a scenario the company has to concentrate their efforts on sampling at the 
processing center (presumably located within the U.S.). For such a scenario, we derive 
the window of sampling frequencies that allow sampling to preempt discovery through 
food borne illness. A sampling strategy outside the specified window is not worth 
implementing as on average it will not yield any benefit.  
If monitoring the supplier is possible, then there is more leeway and sampling 
can be done with lower frequency. We believe that these results provide useful decision 
support by aiding a company in making a decision about their safety efforts through 
sampling depending on their supply chain structure and the resources they have 
available.  
The implementation of a quality control process which eradicates the 
contamination is also considered. In Proposition 2.7.5.1 we show that if a company 
cannot dedicate at least a certain budget to a quality control regimen, then it should not 
employ quality control at all. This is of particular managerial interest, because it shows 
that the benefits from quality control (in terms of avoiding a food borne illness scare) are 
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decidedly not linear in the effort and money spent on quality control, rather there is a 
threshold of quality control effort below which there is no impact at all.  
The second research question was to study the effect of product properties, 
supply chain structure and attributes on the severity of a contamination event.  
A supply chain with multiple retailers is modeled and compared to the single 
retailer supply chain. It is found that the performance metrics are the same for mode of 
detection through sampling at the supplier irrespective of the number of retailers in the 
supply chain. However, the performance metrics worsen as the number of retailers 
increase for all other modes of detection. Therefore, the time required to close the recall 
case, which will depend on the total amount of contaminated stock as well as the 
location and spread of the stock, will be smaller as the number of retailers in the supply 
chain decreases. An identical sampling strategy implemented at the processing center or 
retailer will result in contamination being detected faster as the number of retailers in the 
supply chain decreases. 
The results of a sensitivity analysis are presented in Proposition 2.12.1to study 
the impact of supply chain properties, product attributes and detection policies on the 
overall cost of contamination. The analysis shows that a decrease in lead time(s) results 
in better performance metrics. Therefore the impact of a food contamination event will 
be higher in the case of products with a global supply chain with longer lead times. 
It is also shown that an increase in the shelf life of the product results in a 
worsening of the performance metrics. In addition, the performance metrics worsen with 
an increase in the incubation time. Therefore, illnesses with longer incubation times such 
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as E. coli will result, ceteris paribus, in worse performance metrics as compared to an 
illness with lower incubation time such as bacillus.  
It is also seen in the numerical study that a variation in the input parameters of 
customer demand rate, retailer service level, and the number of final products each item 
of raw material is processed into, have the highest impact on the outputs of the model. 
Two products with different product attributes are contrasted and their 
performance in the case of a contamination event is analyzed. It is shown that for a given 
sampling strategy, the benefit from sampling vs. waiting for customer reports is higher 
for products that exhibit high values of expected incubation time of associated diseases, 
high shelf life and low retailer service levels. An example of this type of product is pork 
products such as ham and roasts. It is concluded that one can sample less frequently in 
the case of products like hams and roasts as compared to, e.g., tomatoes, which have 
lower shelf life, lower expected incubation times, and typically higher retail service 
levels. If a company wants a sampling strategy to be as successful for tomatoes as a 
given sampling strategy for pork products, then they need to sample more frequently, at 
higher cost.  
The final research question was to assess the value of tracking and tracing 
products in the event of a food product contamination and recall.  
To this end, traceability information is incorporated in the supply chain model 
followed by a simulation based study in ARENA in order to analyze the value of a 
traceability system for various scenarios. The impact of supply chain properties and the 
level of traceability implemented on the value of traceability is assessed.  
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Initially, the supply chain simulation is validated by comparing the numerical 
study results to the simulation results which coincide reasonably well. It is found that a 
change in demand has a direct proportional impact on the total amount of contaminated 
stock which is assumed to be an indicator of the value of traceability. This is because as 
the supplier fulfills higher or lower demand its production of contaminated stock also 
increases or decreases respectively. 
Further, we analyze the proportion of raw material and finished products in the 
total contaminated stock for all cases. It is observed that finished products form a greater 
percentage of the total contaminated stock as compared to raw material for the low 
demand case. This is because the other model parameters such as processing times, lead 
times etc. are held the same but since the demand and subsequent production is low; a 
greater percentage of the raw material is processed into finished products. 
In the case of high demand the proportions remain approximately the same as in 
the base case. It was noted that though for the present high demand case the proportions 
of raw material and finished products are same as in the base case, for a further higher 
demand the proportion of raw material in the contaminated stock increases and the 
amount of finished products decreases. 
For the changing lead time scenario it was be seen that as the lead time increases 
or decreases as compared to the base case the total contaminated stock produced also 
increases or decreases respectively.   
This is because as the lead time from the supplier to the processing centers 
increases the time taken for the contaminated products to reach the customer and a food 
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borne illness outbreak to be reported also increases. Hence the time to detection 
increases however, as the demand rate fulfilled by the supplier during this period 
remains the same as in the base case, greater amount of contaminated stock is produced 
when the lead time is longer. Conversely, lesser amount of contaminated stock is 
produced for a decrease in lead time. 
It is also noted that the increase and decrease in contaminated stock for changing 
lead times is not as significant as that for changing demand. Further the proportion of 
raw material is lower as compared to the proportion of finished products in the total 
contaminated stock for the low lead time case. This is because as lead time decreases 
lesser amount of raw material is in transit to the processing center as compared to the 
high lead time case and a greater amount is processed into finished products. For the 
case of high lead time the raw material forms a greater proportion of the stock. 
Therefore it is seen that though the total amount of contaminated stocks are not 
significantly different for changing lead times, the distribution of the stock as raw 
material upstream or finished products downstream differs significantly. Hence, for the 
case of smaller lead times from the supplier to the processing center a traceability system 
downstream is more important, whereas for longer lead times from the supplier to the 
processing center a traceability system upstream is important.  
The impact of a change in the supply chain structure is studied by varying the 
number of processing centers in the supply chain. It is seen that as the number of 
processing centers increase or decrease the amount of contaminated stock also increases 
or decreases marginally. 
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However, of greater significance is the fact that the dispersion of the 
contaminated stock in the supply chain varies as the number of processing centers 
change. The dispersion of the product is an important factor in determining the value of 
traceability. A dispersion factor is formulated and quantified for varying number of 
processing centers. The dispersion factor increases as the number of processing centers 
increase in the supply chain. 
The impact of different levels of traceability is also studied by considering 
scenarios with partial and no supplier information. It is found that the lack of complete 
information leads to a widening of the search space for recall. The potential amount of 
contaminated stock in the partial information case is twice that in the base case. Whereas 
the potential amount of contaminated stock in the no information case is four times that 
in the base case. 
By providing a quantitative model of the impact of contamination in a supply 
chain, our research addresses a crucial gap in the existing literature. This research is 
expected to aid in mitigating risk due to product contamination in the global food supply 
chain. This research can also help in increasing food safety and quality control, which in 
turn can minimize the potential for bad publicity, liability and recalls for companies. The 
present analysis can assist companies in developing criterion for better selection of 
supply chain partners globally. We hope that our results will help companies better 
understand the risk profile of different stages of the food supply chain, and to be able to 
compare the relative merit of preventive quality control. 
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Overall, companies can benefit monetarily by using this information to improve 
supply-chain efficiency, build lower cost distribution networks and create product 
differentiation. The high risk of economic losses associated with food product 
contamination and recall may compel companies to delay product recall. Delaying 
product recall may however lead to higher costs especially in the case of large scale food 
contamination leading to a food borne illness. Quantifying the scope of the 
contamination event, the amount of contaminated stock and the time to detection for 
various scenarios as above can help companies make more informed decisions in the 
case of a contamination event. The assessment of the value of traceability for different 
scenarios can assist companies make more informed decisions when considering the 
implementation of traceability systems. 
 
5.3. Future Research 
For further research we can develop testing and trace back criteria based on our 
model using statistical hypothesis for more effective trace back and recall in the event of 
contamination. This will result in guidelines for better placement of food quality control 
checks for preventing high costs of contamination. 
 This research can be extended to study information sharing between supply 
chain partners for better inventory management in the event of a contamination to 
minimize the repercussions of a recall. Alternate routing and ordering policies in the 
case of a food contamination event can also be analyzed. 
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In real world food supply chains a 1:1 correspondence between the initial raw 
material and the final product may not exist. For example, spinach from several farms 
may be combined, sorted and then packaged into individual products at a processing 
center. Commingling complicates traceability and recall operations in the event of a 
contamination. The present model can be modified to study the effect of commingling 
on the impact of contamination and the value of traceability. 
The prevalence of counterfeit drugs and sale of mispriced drugs by grey market 
sellers has been a growing cause for concern in the pharmaceutical supply chain. A study 
can also be undertaken to adopt the modeling approach in this research to model the use 
of RFID based technology in the pharmaceutical supply chain to track and trace 
counterfeit and mispriced drugs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abad, E., S. Zampolli, S. Marco, A. Scorzoni, B. Mazzolai, A. Juarros, D. Go´mez, I. 
Elmi, G.C. Cardinali, J.M. Go´mez, F. Palacio, M. Cicioni, A. Mondini, T. 
Becker, I. Sayhan. 2007. Flexible tag microlab development: Gas sensors 
integration in RFID flexible tags for food logistic. Sensors and Actuators B: 
Chemical. 127 2–7. 
Akkerman, R., P. Farahani, M. Grunow. 2010. Quality, safety and sustainability in food 
distribution: A review of quantitative operations management approaches and 
challenges. OR Spectrum. 32 863–904. 
Allen, A.O. 1978. Probability, Statistics and Queuing Theory: With Computer Science 
Applications. Academic Press, New York. 
Associated Press. USA Today. 2008. Inspectors struggle to find source of salmonella 
outbreak. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/china/. 
Bell, B.P., M. Goldoft, P. M. Griffin, M. A. Davis, D. C. Gordon, P. I. Tarr, C. A. 
Bartleson, J. H. Lewis, T. J. Barrett, J. G. Wells. 1994. A multistate outbreak of 
escherichia coli o157:h7-associated bloody diarrhea and hemolytic uremic 
syndrome from hamburgers: The Washington experience. Journal of the 
American Medical Association. 272 (17) 1349-1353. 
 Bertolini, M., A. Rizzi, M. Bevilacqua. 2007. An alternative approach to HACCP 
system implementation. Journal of Food Engineering. 79(4) 1322–1328. 
Blisard, N., D. Blayney, R. Chandran, J. Allshouse. 1999. Analyses of Generic Dairy 
Advertising, 1984-97. Technical Bulletin No 1873. Food and Rural Economics 
Division and Market and Trade Economics Division. Economic Research 
Service. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington DC. 
Branigan, T. 2008. Chinese figures show fivefold rise in babies sick from contaminated 
milk. Guardian UK News and Media Limited. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/china/. 
Buckley, P. J. 2007. The strategy of multinational enterprises in the light of the rise of 
China. Scandinavian Journal of Management.  23 (2) 107-126. 
Buhr, B. 2003. Traceability and information technology in the meat supply chain: 
Implications for firm organization and market structure. Journal of Food 
Distribution Research.  34 (3) 13-26. 
 
143 
 
 Buzacott, J.A., J.G. Shanthikumar, 1993. Stochastic Models of Manufacturing Systems. 
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2008. Investigation of Outbreak of 
Infections Caused by Salmonella Saintpaul. 
http://www.cdc.gov/Salmonella/saintpaul/. 
Charlier,C., E. Valceschini. 2006. Traceability, Trust and Coordination in a Food 
Chain. 99th EAAE Seminar Trust and Risk in Business Networks. Boon, Germany. 
Curry, G., B. Deuermeyer. 2002.  Renewal approximations for the departure processes 
of batch system.  IIE Transactions. 34 95-104. 
 Desai, P., N. Patel. 2011. Economics of traceability for easing of food recall costs. 
International Journal of Advanced Economics and Business Management. 1(1) 
39 – 51.  
Dyckman, L. J., E. Lansburgh. 2004. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better 
Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. United States 
Government Accountability Office report to Congressional requesters. GAO-05-
51, US Department of Agriculture, Washington DC. 
Earthbound Farm Organic Foodservice Products. 2010.  http://www.ebfarm.com/Trade/ 
FoodserviceProducts.aspx. 
ERS. 2009. Food borne illness calculator. 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/foodborneIllness/. 
FDA. 2008. Primary Guidance Document on FDA Inspection Policy and Procedures for 
Field Investigators and Inspectors. Investigations Operations Manual. Division of 
Domestic Field Investigations, Rockville, Maryland. 
FDA Recalls and Alerts. 2008. Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/tomatoes.html. 
 FDA Recalls and Alerts. 2010.  E Coli outbreak. 
       http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm211529.htm. 
FDA, U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Recalls, market withdrawals and safety alerts 
listing. http://www.fda.gov. 
Flanders, A. 2008. Economic Impact of Georgia Tomato Production Value Losses due to 
the U.S. Salmonella Outbreak. Center Report: CR-08-17. Center for Agribusiness 
and Economic Development, College of Agricultural and Environmental 
Sciences. University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia. 
144 
 
Food Storage and Shelf Life. 2011. http://www.recipetips.com/kitchen-tips/t--587/food-
storage-and-shelf-life.asp. 
Fritz, M., G. Schiefer. 2009. Tracking, tracing, and business process interests in food 
commodities: A multi-level decision complexity. International. Journal of  
Production Economics. 117 317–329. 
Golan, E.H. 2003. Calculating the cost of food borne illness– A new tool to value food 
safety risks. Amber Waves. 1(2) 6. 
Golan, E., B. Krissoff, F. Kuchler, L. Calvin, K. Nelson, G. Price. 2004. Traceability in 
the U.S. Food Supply: Economic Theory and Industry Studies. Economic 
Research Service, Agricultural Economic Report No. 830. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Washington DC. 
Golan, E., T. Roberts, E. Salay, J. Caswell, M. Ollinger, D. Moore.  2004. Food Safety 
Innovation in the United States Evidence from the Meat Industry. Agricultural 
Economic Report No. 831. Economic Research Service. United States 
Department of Agriculture, Washington DC. 
Gaukler, G., R. W. Seifert. 2007. Applications of RFID in Supply Chains. Trends in 
Supply Chain Design and Management: Technologies and Methodologies. 
Springer-Verlag, London. 
 
Hannus, T., O. Poigne´e, G. Schiefer. 2003. The Implementation Of A Web Based 
Supplychain Information System, Experiences With A Regional Quality Grain 
Program.  In:Harnos Z., Herdon M.,Wiwczaroski T.B. (Eds.). Information 
Technology for a Better Agri-Food Sector, Environment and Rural Living. 
Proceedings EFITA. C.A. Scudder. . Debrecen, Budapest. Hill. 
Hooker, N.H., V. Salin. 1999. Stock Market Reaction to Food Recalls, Smoothing the 
Way for International Trade: The Politics Of Food Safety. The First Annual 
Meeting of the National Alliance of Food Safety. Georgetown University, 
Washington D.C. 
 Jacobs A. 2008. Chinese release increased numbers in tainted milk scandal. The New 
York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/world/asia/03milk.html?Ref=asia. 
Jansen-Vullers, M.H., C.A.Van Dorp, A.J.M. Beulens. 2003. Managing traceability 
             information in manufacture. International Journal of Information Management. 
23 395-413. 
145 
 
Jedermann R., C. Behrens, D. Westphal, W. Lang. 2006. Applying autonomous sensor 
systems in logistics—Combining sensor networks, RFIDS and software agents. 
Sensors and Actuators A:  Physical. 132 370–375. 
Johnson C.K. 2008. Tomatoes pulled off shelves, menus amid salmonella scare. Fox 
News Associated Press. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,364448,00.html. 
Jonge, J. D., H. Van Trijp, R. Jan Renes, L. Frewer. 2007. Understanding consumer 
confidence in the safety of food: Its two-dimensional structure and determinants. 
Risk Analysis. 27(3) 729-740. 
Kilcast, D., P. Subramaniam. 2000. The Stability and Shelf-Life of Food. Woodhead 
Publishing. Cambridge, England. 
Klarevas, L. 2008. Food: An issue of national security. Forbes. 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/24/food-national-security-oped-
cx_lk_1025klarevas.html. 
Kumar, S., E. M. Budin. 2006. Prevention and management of product recalls in the 
processed food industry: A case study based on an exporter’s perspective. 
Technovation. 26(5-6) 739-750. 
 Lippincott, K.M. 2008. Managing the Risks of a Defective Product. Risk Management. 
Occupational Health and Safety. 77(9) 70-72 
Lloyd, T.A., S. McCorriston, C. W. Morgan, A. J. Rayner. 2006. Food scares, market 
power and price transmission: The UK BSE crisis. European Review of 
Agricultural Economics. 33 (2) 119-147. 
Lyles, M.A., B. B. Flynn, M. T. Frohlich. 2008. All supply chains don’t flow through: 
Understanding supply chain issues in product recalls. Management and 
Organization Review. 4(2) 167-182. 
Macartney, J. 2008. US places ban on Chinese food imports. Times Online. 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5152668.ece. 
Marsh, T.L., T. C. Schroeder, J. Mintert. 2004. Impacts of meat product recalls on 
consumer demand in the USA.  Applied Economics. 36 897-909. 
Matsa, D.A. 2009. Competition and product quality in the supermarket industry. 
Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
McDonald M. 2009. Death sentences in China milk case. International Herald Tribune. 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/22/news/23MILK.php. 
146 
 
Mousavi, A., M. Sarhadi, S. Fawcett, S. Bowles, M. York. 2005. Tracking and 
traceability solution using a novel material handling system.  Innovative Food 
Science & Emerging Technologies. 6  91–105. 
Ngai,  E.W.T., F.F.C.Suk, S.Y.Y. Lo. 2008. Development of an RFID-based sushi 
management system: The case of a conveyor-belt sushi restaurant. International 
Journal of Production Economics.  112 630–645. 
Ollinger, M., N. Ballenger. 2003. Weighing incentives for food safety in meat and 
poultry. Economic Research Service. U.S. Department of Agriculture. Amber 
Waves. 1(2) 35-41. 
Outlaw, J. L., R. D. Knutson, L. G. Hamm. 1994. What is a Fairy Surplus, Dairy 
Markets and Policy—Issues and Options. Cornell University Program on Dairy 
Markets and Policy. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
Pennings, J.M.E., B. Wansink, M. T.G. Meulenberg. 2002. A note on modeling 
consumer reactions to a crisis: The case of the mad cow disease. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing. 19(1) 91-100. 
Piggott, N.E., T. L. Marsh. 2004. Does food safety information impact U.S. Meat 
demand?. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 86(1) 154-174. 
Pouliot, S., Sumner D.A. 2008. Traceability, liability and incentives for food safety and 
quality. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 19(1) 15-27. 
Roberts, T., R.A. Morales, C.-T.J. Lin, J.A. Caswell, N.H. Hooker. 1997. Worldwide 
Opportunities to Market Food Safety. Government and the Food Industry: 
Economic and Political Effects of Conflict and Cooperation. 161-178. Eds. Tim 
Wallace, William Schroder. Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands.  
Rong, A., M. Grunow. 2010. A methodology for controlling dispersion in food 
production and distribution. OR Spectrum. 32(4) 957-978. 
Roth, A. V., A. A. Tsay, M. E. Pullman, J. V. Gray. 2008. Unraveling the food supply 
chain: Strategic insights from China and the 2007 recalls. Journal of Supply 
Chain Management. 44 (1) 22-39. 
Salin, V.  2000.  A Real Option Approach to Valuing Food Safety Risks. Economics of 
HACCP: Costs and benefits. Chapter 11 225-240.  Laurian J. Unnevehr, ed., 
Eagan Press. St. Paul, Minneapolis. 
147 
 
Saputra, A., S. Jie-Ae, R. Shadravan. 2008. EU bans baby food with Chinese milk. CNN 
international. 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/25/china.milk/index.html. 
Schlein, L., 2008. China's melamine milk crisis creates crisis of confidence. Voice of 
America. http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-09. 
 Shames, L., 2007. Federal Oversight of Food Safety. High-Risk Designation can bring 
Attention to Limitations in the Government’s Food Recall Programs. GAO-07-
785T. United States Government Accountability Office Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. House of Representatives, Washington DC.  
 Shames, L., 2008. Federal Oversight of Food Safety, FDA’s Food Protection Plan 
Proposes Positive First Steps, but Capacity to Carry them Out is Critical. GAO-
08-435T. United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Committee on Energy and 
Commerce. House of Representatives.  Washington DC. 
Sideri, S. 1997. Globalization and regional integration. European Journal of 
Development Research. 9(1) 38-81. 
Skees, J.R., A. Botts, K. A. Zeuli. 2001. The potential for food insurance to improve 
food safety. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review. 4(1) 99-
111. 
Smith, M.E., E. O. Van Ravenswaay, S. R. Thompson. 1988. Sales loss determination in 
food contamination incidents: an application to milk bans in Hawaii. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 70(3) 513-520. 
Smith, G., J. Tatum, K. Belk, J. Scanga, T. Grandin, J. Sofos. 2005. Traceability from a 
US Perspective. Meat Science. 71(1) 174-193. 
Strohbehn, C.H., S. Beattie. 1995. Food safety consortium project. 
http://www.extension.iastate.edu/foodsafety. Iowa State University Extension. 
Ames, Iowa. 
Sundlof, S.F., 2009. Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. Statement before 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Committee on Energy and 
Commerce U.S. House Of Representatives. Food and Drug Administration 
Department of Health and Human 
Services.http://www.fda.gov/ola/2009/salmonella021109.html. 
148 
 
Teratanavat, R., V. Salin, N.H.Hooker. 2005. Recall event timing: Measures of 
managerial performance in U.S. meat the poultry plants. Agribusiness, An 
International Journal.  21(3) 351-373. 
Thompson, M., G. Sylvia, M.T. Morrissey, 2005. Seafood traceability in the United 
States: Current trends, system design, and potential applications. Comprehensive 
Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety. 4 1–7. 
Thomsen, M.R., R. Shiptsova, S. J. Hamm. 2006. Sales responses to recalls for listeria 
monocytogenes: Evidence from branded ready-to-eat meats. Review of 
Agricultural Economics. 28(4) 513-520. 
Thomsen, M.R., A. M. McKenzie. 2001. Market incentives for safe foods: An 
examination of shareholder losses from meat and poultry recalls. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 82(3) 526-538. 
Tromp, S., E. Franz, H. Rijgersberg, E. Van Asselt, I. Van Der Fels-Klerx. 2010. A 
model for setting performance objectives for salmonella in the broiler supply 
chain. Risk Analysis. 30(6) 945-951. 
Tuominen, P., S. Hielm, K. Aarnisalo, L. Raaska, R. Maijala. 2003. Trapping the food 
safety performance of a small or medium-sized food company using a risk-based 
model: The HYGRAM® system.  Food Control. 14(8) 573-578.  
US Census Bureau. 2006. Economic Census. 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=&-
ds_name=EC0744I1&-_lang=en. 
USDA, ERS data. 2010. Fresh vegetable: Per capita consumption. www.ers.usda.gov/ 
Data/FoodConsumption/Spreadsheets/vegfr.xls. 
Van Asselt, E.D., M.P.M. Meuwissen, M.A.P.M. Van Asseldonk, J. Teeuw, H.J. Van 
der Fels-Klerx. 2010. Selection of critical factors for identifying emerging food 
safety risks in dynamic food production chains. Food Control. 21(6) 919–926. 
Van Gerwen, S.J.C., J.C. De Wit, M.H. Notermans. 1997. An identification procedure 
for food borne microbial hazards. International Journal of Food Microbiology. 
38 1-15. 
Wang, X., D. Li, C. O’Brien, Y. Li. 2010. A production planning model to reduce risk 
and improve operations management. International Journal of Production 
Economics. 124(2) 463–474. 
World Health Organization. 2008. Melamine-contamination event: Expert meeting to 
review toxicological aspects of melamine and cyanuric acid. Held in 
149 
 
Collaboration with FAO and Supported by Health Canada Ottawa, Canada. 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/fs_management/infosan_events/en/index.html. 
Xuequan, M. 2008. China seizes 22 companies with contaminated baby milk powder. 
Xinhua News Agency.  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-
09/17/content_10046949.htm. 
Yuxia, J. 2008. China to destroy 10,000 tons of tainted baby formula. Xinhua News 
Agency. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-09/15/content_10008205.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
150 
 
APPENDIX 
 
SIMULATION OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL IN ARENA 
 
Below is the supply chain model with traceability as simulated in ARENA 
depicted in different stages for a single supplier, processing center and retailer. The 
multiple nodes in the supply chain are modeled similarly. 
 
Figure 27: ARENA model, supplier to processing center 
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Figure 28: ARENA model, processing center to retailer 
 
Figure 29: ARENA model, retailer to customer 
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